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On April 11, 2018 Victoria Police Department 
Constable Ian Jordan passed away. Constable Jordan 
was involved in an on-duty motor vehicle accident in 
1987, which resulted in injuries that left him in a coma 
until his death. 
In the early  morning hours of September 22, 1987 
Constable Jordan was responding to a potential break 
and enter in progress. As other police members 
responded to the scene, Constable Jordan’s vehicle 
collided with another police car at an intersection. 
Constable Jordan was 35-years-old 
at the time of the  incident. He is 
survived by his wife and son, who 
was 16-months old at the time of 
the collision.
The collision resulted in a change of procedure in traffic light control as well as the 
formation of the Victoria Police Department’s Critical Incident Stress Management 
(CISM) team. 
    
  


A PEER READ PUBLICATION

 
 

     
   
    

   


     
    
  


   



     
      
    

         



     
  
   
    
  
   
   
  
  


    
  
  

    
  
   

   
  
   
     
  
   
   
  
   

      
  
   

   
  
  


     
   
    
      
   
    
      

























































































IN MEMORIAM
“They Are Our Heroes. We Shall Not Forget Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
Source: www.VicPD.ca
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Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
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Upcoming Courses
Advanced Police Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC Police Academy
See Course List here.
Note-able Quote
“Character is like a tree and reputation 
like a shadow. The shadow is what we 
think of it; the tree is the real thing.”
Abraham Lincoln
NATIONAL 
POLICE
WEEK
MAY 13-19, 2018
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The book of no: 365 ways to say it, mean it, and 
stop people-pleasing forever.
Susan Newman, PhD with Cristina Schreil.
Nashville: Turner Publishing Company, 2017.
BF 575 A85 N49 2017
Creating courses for adults: design for learning.
Ralf St. Clair.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2015.
LC 5215 S743 2015
Debating hate crime: language, legislatures, and 
the law in Canada.
Allyson M. Lunny.
Vancouver; Toronto: UBCPress, 2017.
KE 8905 L86 2017
The heart of coaching: using transformational 
coaching to create a high-performance coaching 
culture.
Thomas G. Crane with Lerissa Patrick.
San Diego: FTA Press, 2017.
HF 5549.5 C53 C69 2017
K9 aggression control: teaching the out.
Stephen A. Mackenzie.
Edmonton: Brush Education Inc., 2017.
SF 431 M34 2017
Leadership vertigo: why even the best leaders go 
off course and how they can get back on track.
S. Max Brown and Tanveer Naseer.
United States: Familius, 2014.
HD 57.7 B769 2014
Mapping geographies of violence.
Heather A. Kitchin Dahringer & James J. Brittain, 
editors.
Halifax; Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2017.
HM 1116 M37 2017
Misbehavior in organizations: a dynamic 
approach.
 Yoav Vardi and Ely Weitz.
New York; London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2016.
HD 58.7 V367 2016
The power of people skills: how to eliminate 90% 
of your HR problems and dramatically increase 
team and company performance.
Trevor Throness.
Wayne: Career Press, 2017.
HF 5549 T47 2017
Qualitative research: a guide to design and 
implementation.
Sharan B. Merriam & Elizabeth J. Tisdell.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: A Wiley Brand, 2016.
LB 1028 M396 2016
Social work and human services best practice.
Kathy Ellem, Wing Hong Chui & Jill Wilson, editors.
Annandale: The Federation Press, 2017.
HV 3176 S63 2017
Teaching naked techniques: a practical guide to 
designing better classes.
José Antonio Bowen & C. Edward Watson.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2017.
LB 2806.15 B66 2017
Transforming adults through coaching.
James P. Pappas & Jerry Jerman, editors.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2015.
BF 637 P36 T73 2015
Understanding violence and abuse: an anti-
oppressive practice perspective.
Heather Fraser & Kate Seymour.
Black Point; Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2017.
HM 1116 F73 2017
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CAPE 2018
Canadian Association of Police Educators
PRACADEMICS:
Bridging the Gap Between Academia & Police Training
June 25-29, 2018
Pacific Region Training Centre
Chilliwack, British Columbia
www.cape-educators.ca
More info on p. 45
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SUPREME COURT MORE 
DIVIDED ON CASES
In its report, “Supreme Court of 
Canada - Statistics 2007 to 2017”, 
the 2017 workload of Canada’s 
highest Court was outlined. In 2017 
the Supreme Court heard 66 
appeals. This is three more appeals 
than it heard in 2016. The most 
appeals heard annually in the last 
10 years was in 2008 when 82 
cases were brought before the Court. The lowest 
number of appeals heard in a single year during the 
last decade was 65 in 2010.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date it hears a case was 4.6 months, down 
two months from 2016. The shortest time within the 
last 10 years for the Court to announce its decision 
after hearing arguments was 4.1 months (2014) 
while the longest time was 7.7 months (2010). 
Overall it took 15.8 months in 2017, on average, for 
the Court to render an opinion from the time an 
application for leave to hear a case  was filed. This is 
down from the previous year’s statistics when it took 
16.8 months. 
Applications for Leave 
In 2017 there were 492 applications for leave, 
meaning a party sought permission to appeal the 
decision of a lower court. This represents 106 fewer 
applications for leave than in 2016. Ontario was the 
source of most applications for leave at 158 cases. 
This was followed by Quebec (97), the Federal Court 
of Appeal (67), British Columbia (65), Alberta (56), 
Manitoba (17), Saskatchewan (12), Newfoundland 
and Labrador (7), New Brunswick (6), Nova Scotia 
(6), and Prince Edward Island (1). No applications 
for leave came from the Northwest Territories, the 
Yukon or Nunavut. Of the 492 leave applications, 48 
or 10% were granted while 41 were pending. Of all 
applications for leave, 26% were criminal and 74% 
were civil.
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Appeals Heard 
Of the 66 appeals heard in 2017, Quebec had the 
most of any province at 15. This was followed by 
Ontario (13), British Columbia (12), Alberta  (12), the 
Federal Court of Appeal (6), Saskatchewan (3) 
Newfoundland and Labrador (3), New Brunswick 
(1), and the  Yukon (1). No appeals originated from 
Nova Scotia, Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, 
Prince Edward Island or Nunavut. 
Of the  appeals heard in 2017, 
57% were civi l while the 
remaining 43% were criminal. 
Eighteen percent (11%) of the 
criminal cases dealt with Charter 
issues. 
Seventeen (17) of the appeals heard in 2017 were as 
of right. This source of appeal includes cases where 
there  was a dissent on a point of law in a provincial 
court of appeal. The remaining 49 cases had leave to 
appeal granted. This source of appeal requires 
permission from the Supreme Court  to hear it.
Appeal Judgments 
There were 67 appeal judgments released in 2017, 
up from 57 the previous year. Nineteen (19) 
decisions were delivered from the bench while the 
remaining 48 were delivered after being reserved. 
Eighteen (18) appeals were allowed while 25 were 
dismissed. Twenty three (23) decisions were on 
reserve as at December 31, 2017. 
In terms of unanimity, the judges of the Supreme 
Court all agreed in only 54% of its cases. This is 
down significantly 
from the Court’s 79% 
agreement in 2014. 
For the remaining 
46% of its judgments 
released in 2017 the 
Court was split. This is 
the lowest percentage 
of unanimity in the 
last 10 years.
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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISIONS: SPLIT v. UNANIMOUS
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DRIVING OFFENCES LEAD TO 
VEHICLE FORFEITURE 
R. v. Cameron, 2018 QCCA 301
Police attempted to stop the  accused 
for driving with defective lights on the 
trailer he was towing with his truck. 
When police activated their flashing 
lights and siren, the accused began to 
drive dangerously for about 25 kilometers with 
police in hot pursuit. He reached speeds of more 
than 160km/h and drove past a stop sign without 
braking. At one point, the trailer unlatched from the 
truck and stopped in the middle of the road. The 
accused made several manoeuvres to outdistance 
police and even drove at them with his truck, twice 
ramming a  police car. He eluded police after 
abandoning his truck and running into the woods, 
despite the use of a  police dog. He was later found 
and arrested.
Court of Quebec
The accused pled guilty to dangerous 
driving, mischief to a police vehicle and 
possessing a stolen trailer. The Crown 
sought the forfeiture  of his 2013 GMC 
Sierra truck as offence-related property under s. 
490.1 of the Criminal Code. But the accused 
argued the forfeiture of his truck would be 
disproportionate. He submitted that he lived in the 
countryside with no public transportation, he 
needed his truck for work, and that he was still 
making installment payments on it. As well, he 
claimed he had medical problems that required his 
attendance at doctor appointments. He also 
admitted that he  had access to his father’s truck and 
his mother was available to help him get groceries 
and go to his medical appointments.
Under s. 490.1 a court must order as forfeit 
offence-related property where an accused is 
convicted of an indictable offence. However, under 
s. 490.41(3), a court has jurisdiction not to order 
property forfeited if the impact of the  forfeiture 
would be disproportionate to the nature and gravity 
of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offence and the criminal record, 
if any, of the person convicted of the offence. The 
onus i s on the accused to show, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that the forfeiture  of 
the vehicle would be disproportionate. 
The judge concluded that the accused’s vehicle 
should be forfeited. Although forfeiture could be 
disadvantageous to the accused, his truck was not 
essential to him. He could use  his father’s vehicle 
and had transportation from his mother and a  friend 
when necessary. Moreover, the judge considered 
that the accused deliberately  operated his truck in a 
dangerous and reckless manner in order to escape 
from police without considering the lives and 
security of others. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the 
forfeiture  of his truck. In his 
view, the forfeiture judge 
overemphasized the seriousness 
of the offences in his finding that forfeiture was not 
disproportionate in the circumstances. He also 
suggested the judge erred in not finding  that he 
needed his truck for work and in not considering 
his criminal record. But the  Court of Appeal found 
no such error, noting the law was well settled in 
this area:
... The proportionality of the  forfeiture order is 
limited to three factors: the nature and gravity 
of the offence, the circumstances surrounding 
the commission of the offence and the criminal 
record, if any, of the person convicted of the 
offence.
Here, the offences are very serious and their 
commission was accompanied by many 
aggravating factors. The judge was aware that 
the use of the truck was important for the 
[accused] to earn a living, a fact she did not fail 
to consider. She was equally aware of 
alternative means of transport readily available 
to him in that regard. Finally, it is difficult to 
understand how consideration of his criminal 
record could be of assistance to the [accused] 
since it reveals drug and other vehicle-related 
offences. [reference omitted, paras. 5-6]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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NO NEED FOR OFFICER TO ASK 
WHETHER ARRESTEE WISHED 
TO CALL A LAWYER
R. v. Knoblauch, 2018 SKCA 15 
While on patrol, a police officer 
stopped the accused for a possible 
seatbelt violation at 9:20 pm.  The 
officer noted the accused had a 
mouthful of sunflower seeds and an 
odour of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. The 
accused also admitted to having consumed “a 
couple” of drinks (two or three beer). He also had a 
staggered walk, and glassy and droopy eyes. As a 
result, the officer made an approved screening 
device  (ASD) demand and the accused failed. He 
was arrested for impaired driving, advised of 
his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel and asked 
if he understood. The accused said, “Yep, yes”. But 
the officer never asked him if he wanted to speak to 
a lawyer. At 9:32 pm, the officer made a breath 
demand and provided a police warning to him, 
w h i c h t h e  a c c u s e d i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e 
understood.  After attending to other duties at the 
scene, the officer transported the accused back  to 
the detachment where he provided two breath 
samples well over the legal limit. He was charged 
with impaired driving and over 80 mg%.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
Relying on the  officer’s testimony and the patrol car 
video, the judge found that the officer 
never asked the accused if he wanted 
to call a lawyer. Nevertheless, the 
judge held that the accused had been 
properly informed of his right to counsel under s. 
10(b) of the Charter. He was informed that legal 
advice was immediately available, including free 
legal advice through a toll-free number. The judge 
concluded that the accused understood his right to 
counsel and did not assert it.  There was no s. 10(b) 
Charter breach and the certificate of analysis was 
admitted as evidence. The accused was convicted 
of driving a motor vehicle while over 80 mg%. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
The appeal judge found the  accused’s s. 
10(b) right had been violated. In his view, 
a police officer is obligated to inquire 
with a detainee about whether they want 
to exercise their right to counsel. “The prospect of 
the implementational duty being triggered obliges 
the state  authority to ascertain the detainee’s 
wishes about retaining counsel,” said the appeal 
judge. “The requirement of immediacy obliges the 
state authority to do so in as timely a way as 
possible.” The best way for police to ascertain 
whether a detainee wants to invoke their right to 
counsel is for a police officer to ask a detainee the 
question, “Do you want to speak to a lawyer?” The 
certificate of analysis was excluded and, without 
the certificate, there was no evidence of the 
accused’s blood alcohol level. He was acquitted on 
the charge. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed arguing, 
in part, that the appeal judge 
erred in concluding that a 
police officer complying with 
the informational component of  s. 10(b) of 
the  Charter has a duty to ask a detainee whether 
they want to consult with a lawyer.
Justice Ryan-Froslie, writing the Court of Appeal 
judgment, found no such duty existed. She noted 
that s. 10(b) imposes three  duties on police  officers 
when arresting or detaining an individual:
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1. The police must inform a detainee, without 
delay, of their right to retain and instruct 
counsel including the existence and the 
availability of Legal Aid and duty counsel;
2. If a detainee has indicated a desire for 
counsel, the police must provide the detainee 
with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the 
right (except in urgent and dangerous 
circumstances);
3. The police  must refrain from questioning or 
otherwise attempting  to elicit evidence from a 
detainee until they have had a reasonable 
opportunity to consult and retain counsel 
(except in urgent and dangerous circumstances). 
The second and third duties are not triggered unless 
and until a detainee indicates a desire  to exercise 
their right to counsel.  
In this case, Justice Ryan-Froslie  found the appeal 
judge erred in imposing a duty on the police to ask 
the accused whether he wished to exercise his right 
to counsel for the following reasons:
• The purpose or wording of s. 10(b) does not 
mandate an officer to ascertain whether a 
detainee wishes to exercise their  right to 
counsel. Rather, a police officer’s obligation is to 
impart knowledge of the right. 
• Following the fulfillment of the  informational 
duty, a  police  officer has no further obligation 
unless and until the detainee asserts the right to 
counsel.  
• Several courts, including the Supreme Court of 
Canada, have consistently  found the failure of 
the police to not ask a detainee if they wished to 
call a lawyer did not breach s. 10(b). 
The Court of Appeal concluded that a police officer 
does not have a duty under  s. 10(b) to ascertain 
whether a detainee wishes to invoke their right to 
counsel. Thus s. 10(b) is not breached by a  police 
officer who, after properly informing the detainee 
of their to counsel, fails to ask whether the detainee 
wishes to consult with a  lawyer. The appeal judge 
erred in concluding a detainee must unequivocally 
waive their right to counsel before the police can 
elicit evidence  from them. While the accused’s 
silence did not amount to a waiver of his  s. 10(b) 
right to counsel it also did not equate to an 
assertion of that right. In this case, the officer 
properly fulfilled his informational duty by 
informing  the accused of his right to counsel and 
no further duties were imposed on the officer 
unless and until the accused invoked that right. 
Since he did not invoke it, the accused’s s. 10(b) 
rights were not infringed. Since there  was no 
Charter breach, s. 24(2) was not engaged. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and his conviction was 
restored. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Another Knoblauch Note-able Quote
“Police  services provide their officers with caution cards, which 
are used by the officers to inform detainees of their s. 10(b) 
Charter right. Some such cards include a question as to 
whether the detainee wishes to consult counsel; others do 
not ... In my view, there is no magic to the incantation of the 
words on such cards. What is important is not the words used 
but, rather, whether, in the circumstances as a whole, a 
detainee has been properly informed of his or her right to 
counsel.” [references omitted, paras. 28-29]
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FAILURE TO FOLLOW ASD 
MANUAL NOT NECESSARILY 
FATAL TO REASONABLE 
SUSPICION
R. v. Jennings, 2018 ONCA 260 
After following a vehicle and observing 
it straying significantly out of its lane, a 
police officer pulled it over. The officer 
detected an odour of alcohol on the 
accused’s breath and asked him if he had been 
consuming alcohol. After receiving  an affirmative 
response, the officer concluded that he had a 
reasonable suspicion the accused had alcohol in 
his body. A demand for a breath sample into an 
approved screening device (ASD) was made and 
the accused registered a “fail”. He was arrested and 
taken to a police  detachment where he  provided 
two breath samples into a breathalyzer, both 
significantly exceeding 80 mg%.
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge concluded that the officer did 
not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe the accused had 
committed the offence of over 80 mg% 
from the results of the roadside  test with the ASD. 
Although the officer had the requisite  subjective 
belief, the judge found the officer’s belief that the 
accused had committed the offence was not 
objectively reasonable because the officer failed to 
follow three procedures set out in the police 
manual for using the ASD. The officer did not (1) 
perform a self-test of the ASD at the beginning of 
his shift, (2) record the particulars of the ASD 
calibration check in his notebook or  (3) perform a 
second self-test after the accused provided his 
breath sample.
Since the officer did not follow these procedures, 
he could not have reasonably believed that the 
ASD was in proper working order and therefore 
could not use the results of the  roadside  test as a 
reason to believe the accused’s blood alcohol level 
was over 80 mg%. Thus, the breath sample demand 
and taking of the subsequent breath samples at the 
police station amounted to an unreasonable search 
or seizure under s. 8 of the Charter. The judge 
excluded the  breath samples as evidence under s. 
24(2) and the accused was acquitted.  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The Crown challenged the trial judge’s decision but 
an appeal court judge upheld the ruling. In the 
appeal judge’s view, there was no error in finding 
that the officer’s subjective belief in the “fail” result 
was not objectively unreasonable. The trial judge’s 
decision to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) 
was also upheld and the Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown again appealed 
arguing there was no s. 8 
Charter violation in the taking 
of the accused’s breath samples at the police 
station. In the  Crown’s view, the breath samples 
ought not to have been excluded as evidence under 
s. 24(2).
Justice Miller, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
outlined the two-stage investigatory process set out 
in s. 254 of the Criminal Code:
… Initially, an officer with a reasonable 
suspicion that a driver has alcohol in his or her 
body is authorized by s. 254(2) of the Criminal 
Code  to demand the driver provide a breath 
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sample into an ASD. This is a preliminary 
screen only, and registering a fail on the ASD 
cannot be used as evidence that the driver was 
impaired or that his or her blood/alcohol level 
was over the legal limit. But an ASD failure – 
either alone or in combination with an officer’s 
other observations – may provide the officer 
with reasonable and probable grounds to 
conclude that an impaired driving offence has 
been committed. If the officer forms reasonable 
and probable grounds for an arrest, the officer 
is authorized to arrest the driver and demand 
breath samples on an approved instrument 
pursuant to s. 254(3).  
The determination of whether there are 
reasonable and probable grounds to demand a 
breath sample under s. 254(3) of the  Criminal 
Code  has a subjective and an objective 
component: (i) the officer must have an honest 
belief that the suspect committed an offence, 
and (ii) there must be reasonable grounds for 
that belief. [references omitted, paras. 9-10]
In this case, Justice Miller noted that there was no 
dispute that the officer had a subjective belief that 
the accused had been driving while over 80 mg%. 
As for whether the officer’s belief was objectively 
reasonable, he considered the officer’s non-
compliance with the ASD manual was considered: 
Failure to follow policy or practice manual 
directions does not automatically render 
reliance on test results unreasonable. What 
matters is whether the officer had a reasonable 
belief that the device was calibrated properly 
and in good working order, and whether the 
test was properly administered. A failure to 
follow a practice manual direction can serve as 
s o m e e v i d e n c e u n d e r m i n i n g t h e 
reasonableness of an officer’s belief. But the 
fact that an officer failed to follow a practice 
manual direction is not itself dispositive. Not 
every failure to follow a direction is necessarily 
fatal to reasonableness of belief. Not all 
practice manual directions will bear equally, or 
perhaps at all, on the reasonableness of an 
officer’s belief that the ASD is properly 
functioning. It is necessary to take the further 
step and determine how or whether each of the 
specific failures identified undermine the 
reasonableness of the officer’s belief that the 
ASD was functioning properly. [references 
omitted, para. 17]
Justice Miller then went on to address each 
deficiency identified by the trial judge:
1. Not performing a self-test of the ASD at the 
beginning of his shift. Although the officer did 
not perform a self-test of the ASD at the 
beginning of his shift, he did perform a self-test at 
roadside and immediately before administering 
the test. For the purposes of ensuring proper 
functioning of the ASD at the time a test is 
administered, there was no evidence that there 
was any advantage to performing the self-test at 
the beginning of the shift rather than at roadside. 
“The beginning of the shift requirement appears 
simply to be a matter of operational efficiency – 
of avoiding the inconvenience of finding oneself 
in the field with malfunctioning equipment,” 
said Justice Miller. “The failure to follow the 
directive in this particular respect could not have 
had any bearing on the officer’s belief that the 
ASD was functioning when the test was 
administered.”
2. Not recording the calibration particulars of the 
ASD in his notebook. The officer said that he 
checked the calibration and accuracy of the 
device (which must be verified) at the time of the 
stop but did not record the details in his 
notebook as required. Recording calibration 
results is an administrative matter but a failure to 
record does not automatically negate the officer’s 
testimony that he performed the necessary 
checks. Moreover, the officer testified that the 
ASD had a fail-safe feature that would not allow 
it to be operated at all if it was not properly 
calibrated. 
“The determination of whether there are reasonable and probable grounds to demand a 
breath sample under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code has a subjective and an objective 
component: (i) the officer must have an honest belief that the suspect committed an 
offence, and (ii) there must be reasonable grounds for that belief.”
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3. Not performing a second self-test immediately 
after the accused provided a breath sample. 
“This is a matter of best practices, to confirm 
that the ASD remains in working order, and 
would provide some evidence that the ASD was 
properly functioning at the time of the test,” said 
Justice Miller. “But absent something happening 
to the ASD in the brief period after the first self-
test, the constable would have no reason to 
believe that the ASD was no longer in proper 
working order. The failure to perform the second 
self-test does not negate the objective 
reasonableness of the constable’s subjective 
belief that it was in working order when the test 
was administered.”
In this case, the Court of Appeal found it was 
reasonable for the officer to believe the ASD was 
functioning properly and could rely on the 
accuracy of the  results. The officer’s subjective 
belief that the accused had been driving over 80 
mg% was objectively reasonable based on the 
following evidence (facts) and:
• The officer observed the accused’s vehicle 
swaying into the wrong lane; 
• The officer detected alcohol on the accused’s’ 
breath; 
• The accused admitted to having consumed 
alcohol; 
• The officer followed the procedures for use of 
the ASD (except for those noted above);
• The results of the self-test and the calibration 
check indicated the device was working; and 
• The accused’s breath sample registered over 80 
mg%.
Since there was no s. 8 Charter breach it was 
unnecessary to consider the admissibility of the 
breath test results. However, even if there was a 
breach, the evidence ought not to have been 
excluded. First, the officer subjectively believed the 
ASD reading was accurate, took steps to ensure that 
it was and acted in good faith. Second, the impact 
of a  breach would be minimal. And finally, the 
breath samples were reliable evidence. All three 
factors would favour the admission of the evidence.
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused was 
convicted of over 80 mg%, and the matter was 
remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Failure to follow policy or practice manual directions does not automatically render 
reliance on test results unreasonable. What matters is whether the officer had a 
reasonable belief that the device was calibrated properly and in good working order, and 
whether the test was properly administered.” 
Sidebar: s. 24(2) Guidance
Another interesting issue in R. v. Jennings, 2018 ONCA 260 
was which of two approaches courts should take on the s. 
24(2) Charter analysis in breath sample cases. One 
approach considers only the impact of the administration of 
the breath sample procedure, which is itself minimally 
intrusive. The other approach considers not only the breath 
sample procedure, but also the the impact of the procedures 
faced by an accused such as the initial detention, arrest, 
transport to the police station and detention at the police 
station. 
In this case, the trial judge viewed not only the immediate 
impact of providing a breath sample but the overall impact 
of the breach, including his detention in the back of the 
police car, transportation to the police station for breath-
testing and his subsequent detention at the police station. In 
so doing, the trial judge concluded the impact of the breach 
on the accused was serious. The Ontario Court of Appeal, 
however, found this to be an error. Breath sample 
procedures are minimally intrusive and “to find otherwise 
would be to create a categorial rule that s. 8 breaches in 
breath sample cases automatically favour the exclusion of 
evidence ... since drivers in these cases are almost 
invariably arrested and taken to the police station to 
provide further breath samples.” The trial judge was 
mistaken in not finding the impact of the breach minimal 
which favoured admission of the evidence. 
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INVENTORY SEARCH OF 
LAWFULLY IMPOUNDED 
VEHICLE UPHELD
R. v. Cuff, 2018 ONCA 276  
While conducting speed enforcement, 
a police officer saw a vehicle being 
driven well in excess of the speed limit. 
The officer pursued the vehicle and it 
came to a stop in a parking lot of a  multi-unit 
apartment complex. When the officer parked 
behind the accused, the accused got out of his car 
and approached the police car. Through his open 
driver’s door window, the officer asked the accused 
for his licence, insurance and registration. After one 
or two seconds, the  accused fled and the officer 
took up chase on foot. 
A backup officer responded to the area and saw a 
man he believed was the driver running through a 
field. The officer yelled out to the man that he was 
a police officer. He told the man to stop because he 
was being  arrested for failing to identify himself. 
The man looked back and continued to run. When 
the officer caught up to the man (the accused), he 
was arrested for failing to identify himself under s. 
33(3) of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act. The accused 
was handcuffed, identified and advised of his right 
to counsel. He was searched and found to have 
$731.40 cash in his pocket. A computer check 
revealed the accused was on probation for 
possession for the purpose of trafficking and 
possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. The 
probation order required him to keep the peace 
and be of good behavior. He was also arrested for 
breaching probation and was transported to the 
police station. 
The vehicle had been left locked and the accused 
did not have the keys in his possession. The police 
looked for the keys, but could not find them. The 
vehicle was towed to the contract police impound 
yard where an inventory search was conducted. On 
the backseat of the car, the police found a yellow 
plastic shopping bag. This bag contained the 
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accused’s Ontario Health Card with his photo, his 
temporary driver’s licence  and a sandwich style bag 
with numerous smaller baggies containing crack 
cocaine totally  72.2 grams in weight. The search 
was stopped, the vehicle was resealed and a search 
warrant was obtained. As a  result of the warrant, 
the drugs and packaging were recovered.
  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the accused did not 
establish that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle 
therefore he had no standing to assert a 
s. 8 Charter claim respecting its search. And, even if 
he did have a privacy interest, the judge found the 
initial search of the vehicle was a lawful inventory 
search. First, the vehicle was lawfully impounded 
under s. 221 of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA) 
as it was as it had been “apparently abandoned on 
or near a  highway.”  Second, as the police were 
entitled under s. 221 to seize the vehicle, they were 
entitled to conduct an inventory search.  The fact 
that the officers suspected they might find drugs or 
weapons in the car did not change the legitimacy 
of the inventory search. The judge found the towing 
and inventory  search of the vehicle was authorized 
by law.  The judge also found it unnecessary to 
determine whether the accused had been arbitrarily 
detained because any s. 9 Charter breach would 
have had no impact on the admissibility of the 
evidence located within the lawfully seized 
vehicle.  
The cocaine and cash were admissible  as evidence 
and the accused was convicted of possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and breach of 
probation. He was sentenced to 30 months in 
custody, prohibited from firearms for life, ordered to 
provide a DNA sample, given a victim surcharge 
fine, and the money and drug packaging seized 
were forfeited.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the  trial judge 
erred in concluding that the 
vehicle was lawfully seized. In 
his view, s. 221(1) of the  HTA  did not apply 
because the  vehicle  was not “apparently 
abandoned” within the meaning of the statutory 
provision.  Thus, the police were not entitled to 
conduct an inventory search of the vehicle  and in 
doing so breached his s. 8 Charter rights. As well, 
the accused contended that the police were really 
searching the vehicle for a purpose unrelated to 
inventorying its contents; they were  looking for 
drugs. Finally, the accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in not addressing his s. 9 Charter 
submission.  
Impoundment
As for the impoundment of the  vehicle, the trial 
judge made no mistake in finding it lawful. First, 
“s. 221(1) of the  HTA  allows for the seizure of 
vehicles apparently abandoned ‘near a highway’.” 
Second, the specific  facts of this case, including the 
accused’s flight, could be fairly construed as 
“apparent abandonment” under s. 221(1) and 
support the seizure of the vehicle:
(i) the vehicle was not registered in the [accused’s] 
name; 
(ii) the [accused] was unable to produce 
documentation for the vehicle; 
(iii) the vehicle was left on private property, parked 
behind an apartment building; 
(iv) the police on scene had no reason to associate 
the [accused] with the apartment building and, 
BY THE BOOK:
Highway Traffic Act (Ontario)
Abandoned or unplated vehicles
s. 221(1) A police officer or an officer 
appointed for carrying out the provisions of 
this Act who discovers a vehicle apparently 
abandoned on or near a highway or a motor 
vehicle or trailer without proper number plates may take the 
vehicle into the custody of the law and may cause it to be 
taken to and stored in a suitable place.
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in fact, they believed that he did not live in 
Brantford;
(v) the [accused] had run from the vehicle after 
being signalled by the police to stop the vehicle; 
and 
(vi) the keys to the vehicle could not be found.  
[reference omitted, para. 22]
The accused was not simply running away from a 
vehicle left parked on private property. Rather, he 
“attempted to distance himself from a vehicle he 
had been driving by parking it on private 
property,” said the Court of Appeal. “The police 
were unable to link the vehicle the [accused] had 
been driving to the location where he had left it. 
And … the police did not believe that they could 
leave the vehicle the [accused] had been driving 
on the private property where he had left it.” The 
trial judge made no error in concluding that the 
vehicle had been “apparently  abandoned” and it 
was open to the police to seize it under s. 221(1). 
Inventory Search
As for the inventory  search, the Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial judge’s findings. “Having properly 
seized the vehicle, the police were under an 
obligation to keep the vehicle and its contents 
safe,”  said the Appeal Court. “To fulfill this 
responsibility, the police had to conduct an 
inventory search of the vehicle.”  Moreover, the trial 
judge concluded that the primary purpose for the 
search was to inventory the vehicle’s contents: 
The fact that the police may have suspected 
that they would find drugs while searching the 
vehicle did not alter their authority to conduct 
an inventory search. Once they found the 
drugs, the police acted responsibly, ceased 
their search, resealed the car and obtained a 
search warrant. [reference omitted, para. 27]
Detention
The Court of Appeal agreed with the  accused that 
the trial judge erred by failing to rule on his s. 9 
Charter argument. However, it found there was no 
s. 9 breach. The accused’s arrest was lawful and 
entirely justified:
Following the [accused’s] arrest [for failing to 
identify himself], the police were involved in a 
serious investigation into who he was, where 
he lived, and who owned the vehicle he 
seemed so anxious to flee from. The police 
searched the area for about forty minutes after 
the [accused’s] apprehension to determine if he 
had discarded anything. Although the s. 33(3) 
offence was not continuing, this did not mean 
that the arrest under this provision had come to 
an end. [The officer] was clear that he was 
uncertain who owned the vehicle and was 
concerned that it may have been stolen. Among 
other things, one of the reasons to detain under 
s. 149 of the  [Provincial Offences Act]  is to 
prevent the commission of another offence. In 
this environment of uncertainty, while the 
investigation was continuing, it was open to the 
police to detain the [accused] as they did.
Computer checks were appropriately done. 
Within about thirty minutes of the [accused’s] 
apprehension, his breach of probation had 
been discovered. Against the factual backdrop 
of this case, it was open to the police to arrest 
the [accused] on a s. 553 offence for the same 
reasons that justified the ongoing detention 
under s. 149 of the POA. These same facts also 
provide the rationale for detaining the 
[accused] under s. 497(1.1). Releasing the 
[accused] in these circumstances could have 
led to the continued breach of his probation or 
the commission of another offence.  [paras. 
36-37]
Since there were no s. 8 or 9 Charter breaches, 
there was no need to address s. 24(2).  The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor's note: Additional facts taken from R. v. Cuff,
2015 ONSC 6324.
“Having properly seized the vehicle, the 
police were under an obligation to keep 
the vehicle and its contents safe. To 
fulfill this responsibility, the police had 
to conduct an inventory search of the 
vehicle.” 
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INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
AUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE
Turton v. Hanson, 2018 ABCA 84
 
Two police officers attended a casino 
in response to a complaint about three 
patrons refusing to leave. When the 
officers arrived, a security guard 
adv i sed them tha t the cas ino 
suspected that the  plaintiff and his friends had 
damaged a  video lottery  terminal (VLT). The officers 
observed the plaintiff, who was agitated and 
intoxicated, shouting and acting aggressively 
towards a security  guard.  The two police officers 
approached the plaintiff and one officer placed his 
hand on the plaintiff’s chest to separate him from a 
security guard. The police officers advised him that 
they were there to investigate  whether the plaintiff 
or one of his friends had broken a VLT and that he 
was unable to leave until they were done. The 
plaintiff expressed an intention to leave the  casino 
loudly and clearly, using profanity. 
The plaintiff extended his left arm and raised his 
open hand in the air not far from where a police 
officer was standing. The officer grabbed the 
plaintiff’s left arm and brought it down without 
releasing his grip. Within seconds, the plaintiff’s 
right hand formed a fist and he raised it to his waist. 
An officer grabbed the plaintiff’s right arm and 
pulled him forward. A struggle ensued and the men 
ended up against the wall and then on the floor, 
with the plaintiff kicking. The officers told the 
plaintiff to stop resisting and to cooperate. The 
plaintiff stated that he was not resisting. 
One of the officers threatened to use a Taser and 
the plaintiff pleaded with him not to do so. At some 
point, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his mouth. 
Finally, the plaintiff advised that he was done 
resisting. He was handcuffed and placed on a chair 
while the officers reviewed the surveillance video. 
The video showed that the  plaintiff was not 
involved with any property damage. EMS attended 
and the plaintiff was taken to the hospital for 
stitches. He was charged with assaulting a police 
officer and resisting arrest, but those charges were 
later dropped.
Sidebar: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The onus is on an accused to establish standing to raise a s. 
8 Charter challenge. In R. v. Cuff, 2018 ONCA 276the trial 
judge concluded that the accused did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle and therefore no 
standing to argue his s. 8 rights were breached. 
The trial judge found it could be inferred that the accused 
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle. He 
may have locked the doors prior to fleeing and the vehicle 
had been parked at an apartment building where his brother 
resided (even though none of the officers at the scene of the 
arrest knew this). However, the trial judge held this 
subjective expectation was not objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances. While the accused was in possession of and 
was present in the vehicle while driving it, he had 
deliberately removed himself from the vehicle when he fled 
and did not regain possession of it when he and the officers 
returned to the scene. Nor could he have regained 
possession. The doors had been locked and the keys had 
been lost or discarded. As well, the accused did not own the 
vehicle and there was no suggestion he had a historical 
connection to it. Further, there was no evidence that the 
accused occupied the vehicle with the owner’s consent and, 
therefore, no evidence to suggest he had any right to admit 
or exclude anyone from the vehicle. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling 
in finding that the accused had not met his onus in 
establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle.
Volume 18 Issue 2 - March/April 2018
PAGE 18
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The plaintiff sued police, seeking 
damages for assault, battery, false 
arrest, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution and breach of his s. 9 
Charter rights. He argued the two police officers 
were not authorized to detain him in the manner 
they did by using physical force against him when 
they responded to the complaint at the casino. The 
plaintiff conceded that the police had a reasonable 
suspicion that he was connected to a possible 
crime (mischief) and, if force was authorized, the 
level used against him was not excessive. However, 
he argued that the officers were not authorized to 
use any force at all. 
Most of what happened between the plaintiff and 
the officers was captured on the casino’s 
surveillance cameras. The judge found the officers’ 
conduct constituted assault and battery. However, 
he ruled the officers were authorized to use force 
against the plaintiff under their common law power 
of investigative detention. He held that the officers’ 
interference with the plaintiff’s liberty was 
necessary  in the performance of their duties. The 
officers were unaware of exactly what had 
happened when they entered the scene and almost 
immediately observed the plaintiff engaged in a 
loud argument with casino security personnel. 
The officers attempted to defuse the situation and to 
fulfill their duty to investigate by detaining the 
closest man in the group whom security identified 
(the plaintiff).  The judge also accepted that if the 
officers allowed the plaintiff to leave, they may not 
have had access to him for questioning later 
without knowing his identity  or his relationship to 
the other suspects. Having found the investigative 
detention necessary in the circumstances, including 
the use of force, the plaintiff’s claims were 
dismissed.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The plaintiff appealed the trial 
judge’s decision dismissing his 
claims against the police. The 
plaintiff challenged the trial 
judge’s findings, submitting that it was unnecessary 
for police to detain him and to use force against 
him in the context of a suspected offence related to 
mischief of property.
Investigative Detention
The Court of Appeal first acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court of Canada case of R. v. Mann, 2004 
SCC 52 governed the investigative detention 
analysis.  “In Mann, the Supreme Court of Canada 
created a contextual framework for the courts to 
use to assess on a case-by-case basis the bounds of 
the limited police power to intrude upon 
individual liberty,” said the Appeal Court. 
“Investigative detention is a fact-specific inquiry, 
and the bounds of the police’s ability  to detain and 
the scope of that detention will vary depending on 
the circumstances. The analysis of what is 
necessary under the  Mann  test cannot be 
determined in a vacuum or by ignoring the 
context.” The Court of Appeal noted the plaintiff 
was asking it to re-weigh the evidence and find that 
the detention and application of force were 
unnecessary because the police were investigating 
a minor mischief to property offence. 
In this case, the investigative detention involved a 
quick chain of events leading up to the scuffle. 
When the officers arrived at the scene, the situation 
was fluid and escalated quickly. The Court of 
Appeal concluded that the plaintiff had not 
demonstrated any error with the trial judge’s 
statement of the law, his understanding of the 
evidence, or his application of the law to the facts. 
There was ample evidence to support the trial 
judge’s conclusion that the  detention and force 
were necessary, most of which related to the 
plaintiff’s own conduct. The Appeal Court stated:
Based on the trial judge’s assessment of the 
evidence, and in particular, his understanding 
of the evolving nature of the circumstances, the 
[plaintiff’s] drunk and aggressive nature, and 
“Investigative detention is a fact-specific 
inquiry, and the bounds of the police’s 
ability to detain and the scope of that 
detention will vary depending on the 
circumstances.”
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the officers’ reasonable belief that the [plaintiff] 
would attempt to flee before they had an 
opportunity to investigate, the trial judge was 
satisfied that force was necessary in these 
circumstances. 
In coming to this conclusion, the trial judge 
considered and rejected the alternative avenues 
that the officers could have taken instead of 
applying force, such as asking the [plaintiff] 
further questions or waiting for him to make 
good on his threat to leave. He found that none 
of these options were reasonable in the 
circumstances.
In the end, the trial judge concluded that the 
detention was brief, the officers told the 
[plaintiff] the reason for the detention, and it 
was reasonably necessary for the officers to use 
force in these circumstances to prevent the 
[plaintiff] from leaving the premises. [paras. 
23-25]
 
The plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE GROUNDS TO 
ARREST CALLS FOR COMMON 
SENSE 
R. v. Canary, 2018 ONCA 304
While conducting surveillance in an 
unrelated investigation, a  highly 
experienced drug investigator saw two 
men in a parking lot moving 
cylindrical bins from the trunk of one vehicle to 
another. The officer had seen these types of bins in 
the past while investigating other clandestine 
chemical drug labs. In those cases, the bins 
contained Class A precursors under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). The officer 
positioned himself so that he could take a closer 
look. He was able to see that the labels on the bins 
were torn. He then watched as both men entered 
the vehicle into which the bins had been placed. 
While the men were in the vehicle, the licence 
plates of both vehicles were checked on CPIC. The 
checks returned clear. 
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When the accused emerged from the passenger’s 
side of the vehicle, he was holding a brick shaped 
object in a translucent plastic bag. Based on the 
officer’s past experience, including undercover drug 
deals he had been personally involved in, he 
believed that the bag contained cash. When he got 
closer, the officer was able to see a  $20 bill through 
the translucent bag.  After 15-20 minutes of 
observation, the officer formed the belief that the 
men were trafficking in drugs. 
Both men were arrested for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and a search incident to arrest 
followed. Four bins and a box were  found in the 
back of the vehicle in which the  cash exchange had 
occurred. Large plastic bags were used to line  the 
inside of the bins and box. They were full of pills 
and Zip ties were used to close the bags. Although 
the officer did not recognize the pills and was not 
certain of their contents, he nonetheless believed 
they were a prohibited chemical substance under 
the CDSA.  It was later discovered that the pills – 
220,000 of them – weighed over one hundred 
kilograms in total. The translucent plastic bag in the 
accused’s hand at the time of arrest contained 
$14,000 in $20 bills.
The officer decided only to seize the pills and cash 
at the time of arrest, and submit them for analysis 
to determine their contents. The men were released 
after being told that the pills would be analyzed 
and, if they contained a controlled substance, the 
men would be summonsed to court. If the pills 
turned out to be an inert substance, the men were 
told that their property would be returned. The 
police bagged and tagged the evidence and then 
returned to their initial unrelated investigation. A 
sample of the pills were subsequently analyzed as 
steroids.  He was charged with possessing cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking  and possessing 
proceeds of crime.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought to have the pills and 
money excluded as evidence. He 
submi t t ed tha t t he o f f i ce r had 
insufficient grounds to arrest him. 
Further, even if the officer initially had the 
necessary  grounds for arrest, he argued that, as the 
investigation continued, the grounds for arrest 
evaporated and the property seized should have 
been returned to him. The judge, however, rejected 
the accused’s contention. In his view, the 
experienced drug enforcement officer’s conclusion 
that the accused was involved in a drug transaction 
was reasonable.  Choosing to release the accused 
because  the pills were not recognized was nothing 
more than a reasonable exercise of discretion, 
which did not alter the nature of the arrest.  The 
judge ruled the arrest was based on reasonable 
grounds and that the search incident to arrest was 
lawful. And, even if he was wrong in not finding a 
Charter breach, the judge would have admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2) anyways. The accused was 
convicted of possessing a controlled substance for 
the purposes of trafficking and possessing proceeds 
of crime. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions. Among other 
things, the accused maintained 
that his Charter rights under ss. 
8 and 9  were breached because his arrest was 
unlawful and the search incident to arrest was 
unreasonable. Further, even if the arrest and search 
were lawful, he maintained that the police were 
required to return the items seized when they 
decided to unconditionally release him from the 
scene. 
The Arrest
Justice Fairburn, speaking for a  unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found the police did have sufficient 
grounds to justify the accused’s arrest and therefore 
the search incident to arrest was also lawful.  The 
Appeal Court described the police power of arrest 
this way:
Where a peace officer believes on reasonable 
grounds that a person has committed an 
indictable offence, the officer may make a 
warrantless arrest: s. 495(1)(a) of the  Criminal 
Code. There is both a subjective and objective 
component to the reasonable grounds inquiry. 
To fulfill the subjective requirement, the officer 
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must hold an honest belief that the person 
committed an offence. The officer “must 
subjectively believe that there are reasonable 
grounds to make the arrest”. To fulfill the 
objective requirement, the officer’s belief must 
be objectively reasonable in the circumstances 
known to the officer at the time of arrest. The 
objective inquiry asks whether “a reasonable 
person, standing in the shoes of the police 
officer, would have believed that reasonable 
and probable grounds existed to make the 
arrest”.
 
When considering whether an officer’s 
subjective belief is objectively reasonable, the 
court looks at the objectively 
discernible facts through the eyes 
of a reasonable person with the 
same knowledge, training and 
e x p e r i e n c e a s t h e o f f i c e r. 
Determining whether sufficient 
grounds exist to justify an exercise 
of police powers is not a “scientific 
or metaphysical exercise”, but one 
that calls for the application of 
“[c]ommon sense, flexibility, and 
practical everyday experience.” 
The reasonable grounds standard does not 
require the establishment of a prima facie case 
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The test is 
met where, based on all of the circumstances 
known to the officer, “credibly-based 
probability” replaces suspicion. [references 
omitted, paras. 21-23]
Justice Fairburn then considered whether the trial 
judge erred in determining  whether the officer had 
the requisite reasonable grounds to justify the 
arrest. In concluding that the officer’s subjective 
belief that he was witnessing a  drug transaction was 
objectively reasonable in the totality of the 
circumstances, Justice Fairburn stated:
The trial judge properly took into account [the 
officer’s] over 15 years investigating drugs and 
his work as an undercover drug officer. It was 
through the lens of that experience that [the 
officer’s] observations had to be considered, 
including: 
(i) two vehicles parked in a remote part of a 
parking lot; 
(ii) no markers on the vehicles that might 
suggest that they were connected to a 
legitimate business; 
(iii) bins of a kind that he had previously seen 
in clandestine chemical drug labs 
containing Class A  CDSA  precursors, 
being moved from one trunk to another; 
(iv) labels ripped off of the bins, causing [the 
officer] to believe that the bins were not 
involved in what he described as a 
“legitimate” transaction; 
(v) a man emerging from a vehicle carrying a 
brick-like package in a plastic bag, 
looking similar to cash the officer himself 
had packaged for undercover drug deals 
in the past; and
(vi) a noticeable $20 bill showing through the 
plastic bag. 
[The officer] testified that these observations 
were consistent with other high-level drug 
transactions he had witnessed in the past. 
Indeed, he testified that he had never seen a 
transaction like this one that did not constitute 
a drug transaction. [paras. 25-26]
The accused also attempted to undermine the 
officer’s reasonable  grounds by highlighting 
i n n o c e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s o r e x c u l p a t o r y 
interpretations for the factors the officer relied upon 
to establish reasonable grounds for the arrest. For 
example, he noted:
“To fulfill the objective requirement, the 
officer’s belief must be objectively 
reasonable in the circumstances known to 
the officer at the time of arrest.”
“When considering whether an officer’s subjective belief is objectively reasonable, the 
court looks at the objectively discernible facts through the eyes of a reasonable person 
with the same knowledge, training and experience as the officer.”
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• Legitimate trunk-to-trunk transactions can take 
place, as can cash transactions; 
• The officer acknowledged that, from his 
previous exposure to the bins, he had found 
them to contain only Class A precursors and 
not actual prohibited substances; 
• The CPIC check on the vehicles did not turn up 
anything of concern; 
• The transaction took place in broad daylight; 
and
• The men demonstrated no surveillance-
conscious behaviour. 
But the Court of Appeal rejected this submission. 
“This argument disregards the correct approach to 
considering the objective  reasonableness of the 
arresting officer’s subjective belief,” said Justice 
Fairburn. “Facts known to an officer at the time of 
arrest should not be considered within individual 
silos. The question is not whether each fact, 
standing alone, supports or undermines the 
grounds for an arrest. The question is whether the 
facts as a whole, seen through the eyes of a 
reasonable person who has the  same knowledge, 
training and experience as the arresting officer, 
make the arrest objectively reasonable.”
The Search
Since the initial arrest was lawful, the  Court of 
Appeal found the search incident to arrest was also 
lawful:
  
A search incident to arrest rests on three 
components: (a) the arrest is lawful; (b) the 
search is truly incidental to the arrest, in the 
sense that it is connected to the arrest, either as 
a means by which to discover and preserve 
evidence connected to the arrest, protect safety, 
or protect against escape; and (c) the search is 
conducted reasonably. 
I have already determined that the arrest was 
lawful. I also find that the search was truly 
incidental to arrest and conducted reasonably. 
Taking the money from the [accused’s] hand 
and searching for the content of the bins was 
clearly connected to the purpose of the arrest. 
The arrest arose from these very items having 
been observed. There is no suggestion that the 
searches were done unreasonably. It follows, 
therefore, that a lawful search took place, 
incident to the lawful arrest.  [references 
omitted, paras. 33-34]
“Abandoned” Arrest
The accused also contended that, even if the  initial 
arrest was lawful, the grounds for arrest 
disappeared when the  police were unable to 
identify  the pills as controlled substances. He 
asserted that the police were then required to 
return the seized items once the arrest was 
effectively  “abandoned”. This submission was also 
rejected. Even though the officer did not recognize 
the pills, he nevertheless continued to believe they 
contained a controlled substance. Thus, the officer 
continued to believe he had witnessed a drug deal: 
…[I]t seems like an eminently reasonable 
conclusion that an experienced drug officer 
looking at 220,000 pills in plastic bags tied 
“A search incident to arrest rests on three components: (a) the arrest is lawful; (b) the 
search is truly incidental to the arrest, in the sense that it is connected to the arrest, 
either as a means by which to discover and preserve evidence connected to the arrest, 
protect safety, or protect against escape; and (c) the search is conducted reasonably.”
“Facts known to an officer at the time of arrest should not be considered within individual 
silos. The question is not whether each fact, standing alone, supports or undermines the 
grounds for an arrest. The question is whether the facts as a whole, seen through the 
eyes of a reasonable person who has the same knowledge, training and experience as the 
arresting officer, make the arrest objectively reasonable.”
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with zip ties, placed in the type of bins that the 
officer knew to be associated with clandestine 
chemical drug labs, passed in a trunk-to-trunk 
transaction, would maintain his belief that the 
pills contained a controlled substance. This 
b e l i e f t a k e s o n a n a d d e d l aye r o f 
reasonableness when one considers that the 
men involved had just exchanged a brick of 
cash contained in a plastic bag. [para. 37]
The accused argued that the officer’s continued 
belief was not reasonable because only a limited 
search incident to arrest was conducted (his 
cellphone was not seized) and he was released 
from the scene without conditions (as opposed to 
release under s. 497(1) of the Criminal Code). But 
this submission was dismissed. The Court of Appeal 
found the  manner in which the police exercised 
their discretion at the scene did not require the 
return of the property  that was seized incident to 
arrest:
This argument seems to come down to a 
suggestion that the failure of the police to 
exercise their discretion at maximum tilt should 
serve to cast doubt on the reasonable grounds 
for an arrest. This is problematic reasoning. The 
police have broad discretion to exercise their 
powers in a manner commensurate with the 
circumstances at work. Discretionary decisions 
that serve to minimize intrusions into privacy, 
and maximize liberty interests, should be 
encouraged, not discouraged. I agree with the 
trial judge that the fact that [the officer] chose 
not to seize the [accused’s] phone, or conduct 
a more thorough search incident to arrest, 
m e r e l y d e m o n s t r a t e s a r e s p o n s i b l e 
discretionary call on the officer’s part. It is 
not  prima facie  evidence that he did not 
continue to maintain his grounds for arrest. 
In addition, the decision to release the 
[accused] from the scene was a responsible 
one. [The officer] told the [accused] that if the 
analysis showed that the drugs contained 
controlled substances, the officer intended to 
summons the [accused] to court. The fact that 
the officer did not issue an appearance notice 
or immediately move to have the [accused] 
summonsed to court (both options under s. 
497(1) of the  Criminal Code), did not 
undermine the grounds for arrest. 
The key fact is that, at the time that the pills 
and money were lawfully seized, the [accused] 
was under lawful arrest. In these circumstances, 
it was open to the police to release the 
[accused], yet continue their investigation. The 
police were under no obligation to give the 
lawfully seized items back while the 
invest igat ion cont inued. I t would be 
undesirable to construct a rule that would 
require the police to commit to a greater 
intrusion into  Charter  interests, only to justify 
seizures that were lawfully made in the first 
instance. Accordingly, it is open to the police to 
release someone in the field, all the while 
maintaining a belief that the person committed 
an offence and that the items lawfully seized 
should be held.  [paras. 39-41]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions were upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
In the R. v. Canary case, 31 days following the 
arrest and just over two weeks after the  certificates 
of analysis were received, a  report to a justice was 
filed under s. 489.1 of the  Criminal Code. The 
accused argued the failure by the police to file a s. 
489.1  report to a  justice as soon as practicable 
constituted a  s. 8 Charter breach. Because this issue 
was raised for the first time on appeal and there 
was an insufficient factual record to determine the 
matter, the Court of Appeal declined to address this 
submission. However, it made the following 
comments concerning the  filing of report to a 
justice:
Where the police wish to keep something 
seized during the execution of their duties, s. 
489.1(1)(b)(ii) of the  Criminal Code  requires 
that they make a report to a justice “as soon as 
is practicable”. A report filed under s. 489.1(1)
(b)(ii) allows the seized items to be dealt with in 
accordance with s. 490(1), which grants a 
justice the power to order the things seized 
detained or returned. The balance of s. 490 
contains numerous provisions governing the 
continued detention, use, and return of seized 
property. 
A Note on 5.2s
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Section 489.1(1) applies to seizures made both 
with and without prior judicial authorization. 
The provision fulfills an important purpose, 
providing the gateway to s. 490 of the Criminal 
Code . Sec t ion 489 .1 shou ld no t be 
conceptualized as a meaningless exercise in 
paperwork. Filing the initial report under s. 
489.1(1) is the act that places the property 
within the purview of judicial oversight. It 
provides for a measure of police accountability 
when dealing with property seized pursuant to 
an exercise of police powers. This provides an 
important measure of protection to the party 
who is lawfully entitled to the property, but also 
provides a measure of protection to the police 
who become the custodians responsible for the 
property seized. Allowing for this type of 
oversight is particularly important in the wake 
of warrantless seizures, ones where no prior 
authorization has been given, meaning the 
seizures are beyond the knowledge of the 
judicial system.  [references omitted, paras. 
44-45]
In so far as what constitutes “as soon as 
practicable”, the Appeal Court stated:
There is an inherent flexibility built into the 
assessment of whether the police acted “as 
soon as is practicable”. Determining whether 
this requirement has been met is a necessarily 
fact-specific inquiry and one that should only 
be answered after a careful review of all of the 
evidence, including any explanations for why 
the report was filed when it was. [reference 
omitted, para. 47]
TRESPASS NOT TANTAMOUNT 
TO PRIVACY BREACH
R. v. Le, 2018 ONCA 56 
At about 10:40 pm three police 
officers were patrolling a townhouse 
complex plagued by a very high level 
of violent crime, most of which was 
associated with gangs, guns and drugs. The officers 
spoke with two security guards responsible for 
overall security at the housing complex and general 
crime prevention in the area. The officers were 
looking for two people  wanted by the police and 
known to be  involved in violent crimes in the 
housing complex area. The security guards 
indicated that one of the men hung around an area 
of the complex behind townhouse #84. The 
security guards described that area as a  “problem 
area” associated with drugs and other criminal 
activities.
After speaking to the security guards, the police 
decided to walk through the townhouse complex to 
the area that the guards had identified. The officers 
walked along a paved footpath that travelled 
through the complex. The footpath stopped at a 
walkway that led into the backyard at #84. The 
backyard was surrounded by a waist-high wooden 
fence with an opening where the  walkway was 
located. There was no gate. The officers saw five 
young men they did not recognize, including the 
accused, sitting in the backyard simply talking. 
They were not doing anything wrong.  Police 
walked through the fence opening into the 
backyard. Neither officer asked permission to enter 
the backyard or said anything to the young men 
before entering. But no one objected to their 
presence either. Police cordially addressed the 
group and learned the accused did not live at the 
townhouse. However, they also learned that one of 
the men, who produced identification, lived in the 
townhouse with his mother. 
When an officer saw one of the men on the couch 
put his hands behind his back he  told the man to 
keep his hands in front of him. As police were 
identifying the men, the accused responded that he 
did not have any identification on him. The accused 
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“Section 489.1(1) applies to seizures 
made both with and without prior judicial 
authorization.”
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looked nervous to the officer. He had a bag slung 
over his shoulder sitting on his hip and appeared to 
be “blading” his body. Concerned that the accused 
might have a weapon, the officer asked, “What’s in 
the bag?”  The accused immediately bolted from the 
backyard and the  officers gave chase. The accused 
was tackled and a fight ensued. During the fight the 
police became aware the accused had a pistol in 
his bag and was trying to reach for it. The fight 
intensified and the accused was subdued. A search 
at the scene of the arrest and at the  police station 
yielded a fully-loaded, .45 calibre semi-automatic 
Ruger pistol , 13 grams of cocaine, and 
considerable cash. The accused was charged with 
10 criminal offences including firearm and drug-
related crimes.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the police were entitled 
to enter the backyard and speak to the 
men under the common law “implied 
licence” doctrine.  The judge also held 
the accused was a “mere transient guest”  and did 
not have a  reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
backyard. Although the accused was physically 
present in the backyard, he had no possession or 
control of any kind over the backyard and no 
means to regulate access to the property. Nor was 
there  any evidence of his historical use of, or 
connection with, the property. The judge also ruled 
that the accused was not detained until the officer 
asked him what he had in the bag slung over his 
shoulder. At this point, he became the target of a 
focussed investigation. This detention, however, 
was lawful.  The officer had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the accused was armed and the 
investigative detention was justified. But the 
accused fled before he could be physically 
detained.  
The judge went on to decide that, had there 
been  Charter  breaches, the evidence would 
nevertheless be admissible  under s. 24(2). He 
concluded that all three s. 24(2) factors - the 
seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, 
the impact on the Charter-protected interests of the 
accused and society's interest in adjudication on 
the merits - favoured admission of the  evidence. 
The accused was convicted of several firearm and 
drug-related offences and sentenced to five years in 
prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that police breached his ss. 8 
and 9 Charter rights. In his view, 
the police unlawfully  entered the 
backyard of the townhouse and 
in doing so breached his right to 
be free from unreasonable search. As well, he 
claimed he was arbitrarily detained when police 
walked into the backyard and questioned him and 
the other young men. He contended that the ss. 8 
and 9 breaches, together or individually, warranted 
the exclusion of the evidence seized from him.
s. 8 Charter (Search & Seizure)
Justice Doherty, speaking for the majority, 
questioned the trial judge’s finding that the police 
were authorized to enter the backyard under the 
implied licence doctrine. Without deciding the 
matter, he nevertheless assumed that the police 
entry  was unlawful and they were trespassers in the 
backyard. This unlawful entry, however, did not 
necessarily amount to a s. 8 Charter violation 
unless the entry also interfered with the accused’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The majority 
described the interplay between the right to privacy 
and s. 8 this way:
Section 8 of the Charter protects an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy from 
unreasonable state intrusion. State conduct that 
infringes on an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy will be treated as a 
search for the purposes of s. 8.
In considering a reasonable expectation of 
privacy claim, the court begins by identifying 
the subject matter of the claim. It then asks first, 
did the claimant have a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the subject matter, and second, if 
so , was tha t expecta t ion objec t ive ly 
reasonable? The second of these two inquiries 
is almost inevitably the determinative 
consideration. [references omitted, paras. 
32-33]
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And further:
A reasonable expectation of privacy does not 
exist in the air or in the abstract. One has or 
does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in respect of a specified subject matter 
in specified circumstances.
The subject matter of a privacy claim may be 
the person of the claimant, a place, 
information, or a combination of the three. The 
fac to r s tha t wi l l be re levan t to the 
determination of whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists and the weight to 
be assigned to any particular factor will depend 
in large measure on the subject matter of the 
privacy claim. For example, if the privacy claim 
is informational, the potential capacity of the 
information to reveal core biographical data 
relating to the claimant will be crucial in 
assessing the privacy claim. However, if the 
subject matter of the privacy claim is a place, 
control over that place will play a central role 
in assessing the validity of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy claim. If the privacy 
claim has both a territorial and informational 
component, then all of the relevant factors will 
be considered. [references omitted, paras. 
35-36]
In this case, the accused did not advance an 
informational privacy claim in respect to what he 
was doing or saying in the backyard. Rather, he 
contended only a territorial privacy claim. He 
argued that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to the physical space of the 
backyard. 
Justice Doherty  concluded the trial judge correctly 
applied the law with respect to any territorial 
privacy interest the  accused may have had in the 
backyard. Property law concepts do not determine 
privacy interest. Here, there was no evidence that 
the accused had any control over the property, had 
used it in the past, had any relationship with the 
owner or occupant that would establish some 
special access, or had any ability to regulate access 
to the property.  Nor was there any evidence that 
the accused, as an invited guest, had the  de 
facto power to control who can access or stay on a 
property. “The right to be left alone, when 
exercised in relation to real property, must, in my 
view, include some ability, either as a matter of 
law, or in the circumstances as they existed, to 
control who can access and/or stay  on the 
property,” said Justice Doherty. “One cannot 
realistically talk  about a reasonable expectation of 
privacy  in respect of real property without talking 
about an ability to control, in some way, those 
who can enter upon, or remain on, the property.” 
In this case, the accused’s physical presence  in the 
backyard, although relevant to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy inquiry, did not support a 
finding that he had some kind of control over who 
could access or remain on the  property. Since the 
accused did not have a reasonable  expectation of 
privacy in the backyard, the police entry into it did 
not infringe his s. 8 Charter rights.
 s. 9 of the Charter (Arbitrary Detention)
The accused argued that he was arbitrarily 
detained, in the psychological sense, from the 
moment the police entered the  backyard. The 
majority agreed that the accused was detained 
when he was asked about the contents of his bag. 
Psychological detention was described as follows:
The test for psychological detention is an 
objective one. The court must determine 
whether a reasonable person, in the [accused’s] 
circumstances, would conclude that he or she 
was not free to go and had to comply with the 
police direction. Although the test is objective, 
the [accused’s] perception that he was in fact 
free to leave and was not being detained by the 
police when they entered the backyard must be 
an important consideration in determining how 
the encounter between the officer and the 
[accused] would be reasonably perceived. The 
[accused’s] perception is particularly significant 
as he is no stranger to street-level encounters 
with the police. [reference omitted, para. 63]
But the majority found this psychological detention 
to be lawful. “The [accused’s] movements 
simultaneously aroused the suspicions of two 
police  officers who, based on their training and 
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experience, connected the [accused’s] movements 
to the possession of a weapon,” said Justice 
Doherty. “There was a basis upon which [the 
officer] could reasonably suspect that the 
[accused] was armed. That suspicion justified an 
investigative detention.”
As for the police trespass in the backyard, the 
majority ruled it did not vitiate the  legality of the 
accused’s detention:
… I do not think that the status of the officers as 
trespassers would affect the lawfulness of the 
[accused’s] detention. Section 9 is intended to 
protect individuals from unlawful state 
intrusion upon the liberty of the individual. On 
the trial judge’s finding, there was no intrusion 
upon the [accused’s] liberty until [the officer] 
asked him what was in the bag. Even if the 
police were trespassers on the Dixon property, 
that trespass had no impact on any facet of the 
[accused’s] liberty. His liberty was limited only 
after [the officer] had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the [accused] was armed and 
committing a criminal offence. 
One might well come to a different conclusion 
as to the lawfulness and, hence, arbitrariness of 
the detention if the police had unlawfully 
entered the property for the purposes of 
detaining the [accused] and the other young 
men in the backyard. The situation may also 
have been different if the [accused] could 
demonstrate that the improper entry into the 
backyard by the police somehow interfered 
with his personal rights or individual liberty. 
On the trial judge’s findings, the police did not 
enter the property intending to detain anyone. 
Nor did their entry in any way infringe upon 
any of the [accused’s] rights. 
In my view, in the circumstances of this case, 
the lawfulness of the police entry into the 
backyard had no impact on either the 
determination of the point in time at which the 
[accused] was detained, or the arbitrariness of 
that detention. There was no breach of the 
[accused’s] s. 9 right, even if the police were 
trespassing. [paras. 72-75]
s. 24(2) of the Charter
Even if the accused’s rights under ss. 8 or 9 of the 
Charter were breached, the majority would have 
admitted the evidence anyway. First, any Charter-
infringing state conduct was technical, inadvertent, 
and made in good faith. Second, the impact of any 
breach on the accused’s Charter-protected liberty 
interest was momentary and minimal. Finally, 
society's interest in an adjudication on the merits 
favoured admission as the evidence was highly 
reliable and the crimes were very serious.
A Different View
Justice Lauwers, in dissent, disagreed 
with the majority’s analysis and would 
have excluded the evidence. First, the 
police entry into the backyard of the 
townhouse exceeded the bounds of the implied 
licence doctrine and was therefore unlawful. 
Second, the accused, as an invited guest at his 
friend’s home, did have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the backyard and therefore standing to 
challenge the police conduct. Third, from this 
unlawful entry flowed an arbitrary detention, the 
flight, the arrest, the search and the  finding of the 
evidence. In Justice Lauwers’ view, the accused 
was psychologically detained by the police when 
they suddenly and without seeking permission 
barged into the backyard of the townhouse 
property. 
“When police enter a property as trespassers, they 
act outside the bounds of their lawful authority,” 
said Lauwers. “The detention of the [accused] 
occasioned by the police while  they were acting 
outside their lawful authority was, on its face, an 
arbitrary detention. It was not authorized by law 
because the police were not entitled to exercise 
any of their investigative powers, including the 
common law power to detain for investigative 
purposes, while they were trespassers on the 
property. What I see  here, to be blunt, is casually 
intimidating and oppressive police misconduct.” 
He would have then excluded the evidence - the 
gun, the drugs and the money – under s. 24(2). 
Although the evidence was reliable, important to 
the Crown’s case and society had a significant 
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interest in the prosecution of firearm and drug 
offences, the Charter-infringing state conduct was 
serious. The police, on information about possible 
criminality that was at best speculative, unlawfully 
entered onto private property, someone’s home, as 
trespassers. Second, the impact of the breach on 
the accused’s Charter-protected interests was 
significant. His liberty interest was unlawfully 
suspended and the breach provided the police with 
incriminating evidence that they would not have 
otherwise discovered. 
In concluding the admission of the evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute, 
Justice Lauwers commented:
Perhaps the officers were emboldened by the 
sense they were doing the right thing in trying 
to root out criminality in the community. They 
seem to have assumed the young men in the 
backyard were up to no good and decided to 
confront them suddenly. I doubt that the police 
would have brazenly entered a private 
backyard and demanded to know what its 
occupants were up to in a more affluent and 
less racialized community. The occupant of a 
residence might tolerate sudden police 
intrusion into private space if there were an 
emergency or the police were in hot pursuit of 
a suspect or fugitive, however shocking they 
might find it. There is no such pretext in this 
case. [para. 163]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: R. v. Le, 2018 ONCA 56   case is 
under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada as of 
right. It is scheduled to be heard October 12, 2018.
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WHAT IS BLADING?
In R. v. Le, 2018 ONCA 56, Justice Doherty 
described “blading” as “a term used by the 
police to describe a body movement whereby a 
person attempts to position himself so that an 
officer cannot see an object sitting on the 
person’s hip. The police are trained to associate 
this manoeuver with possession of a firearm.” 
Blading is one of several movements that police 
officers have been trained in that may signal 
possession of a firearm (see for example R. v. Peterkin, 
2015 ONCA 8 at para. 28). Other cases describe 
blading as:
• “A person blades his body when he turns 
sideways to his counterpart. A person may 
blade his body to protect a firearm held on 
one side.” - R. v. Fountain, 2015 ONCA 354 at footnote 1.
• “In police jargon, ‘blading’ is a synonym for 
hiding or obscuring something.” - R. v. Amofa, 2011 
ONCA 368 at para. 9.
• “The police officer observed suspicious 
behaviour (‘blading’, a police term for an 
attempt to conceal a weapon) ...” - R. v. Grant, 2007 
ONCA 26 at para. 3.
Volume 18 Issue 2 - March/April 2018
PAGE 29
COPS STILL ON TOP AS 
RESPECTED JUSTICE 
PROFESSION
Police officers are more 
respected by Canadians 
than judges, lawyers or 
lawmakers. In a recently 
released Canada wide Insights West poll, police 
officers were viewed more positively among 
Canadians than other justice professions. The survey, 
which asked Canadians about 28 occupations, saw 
police officers attain a 71% positive opinion of their 
professions followed by judges (68%), lawyers (48%) 
and politicians (law makers) at 22%. 
Fast Facts
• People had the highest opinion of firefighters at 
92 % followed by nurses (91%). Farmers (88%), 
doctors (87%) and teachers (86%) rounded out 
the top five professions. 
• Politicians ranked the lowest at 22% followed 
by car salespeople (26%) and pollsters (42%).
• More women (73%) held a higher view of 
police  than men (69%). Both of these 
percentages are down from the 2017 survey 
where  81% of women held a positive view 
while 72% of men did so.
• The older the person, the more likely they were 
to hold a positive opinion of the police. 
• Opinions of the police varied across Canada. 
Quebec had the lowest opinion while  Atlantic 
Canada had the highest. 
• People who voted Conservative in the 2015 
federal election were more likely than people 
voting NDP or Liberal to have a positive opinion 
of the police. 
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Profession Very or Somewhat Positive Opinion
Firefighters 92%
Nurses 91%
Farmers 88%
Doctors 87%
Teachers 86%
Scientists 84%
Engineers 82%
Veterinarians 82%
Architects 81%
Dentists 78%
Accountants 75%
Military Officers 74%
Police Officers 71%
Psychiatrists 71%
Athletes 70%
Journalists 70%
Judges 68%
Auto Mechanics 62%
Actors/Artists 61%
Building Contractors 56%
Priest/Ministers 52%
Bankers 51%
Lawyers 48%
Business Executives 47%
Realtors/Real Estate Agents 47%
Pollsters 42%
Car Salespeople 26%
Politicians 22%
Source: Insights West, “Firefighters and Nurses Top List 
of Canada’s Respected Professionals”. March 15, 2018.
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Positive opinions for all four 
justice system professions 
dropped from the 2017 
survey. 
The Ask: “All things considered, do you have a 
positive or negative opinion of each of the 
following professions?”
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RGB TO BE APPLIED IN 
PRACTICAL, NON-TECHNICAL & 
COMMON SENSE WAY
R. v. Manlove, 2018 BCCA 37
At 1:00 am a man stole  some bicycles 
from the second floor balcony of a 
building and moved them to the 
backyard of another property, which 
was also known as a “drug house”. At 
5:00 am a blue car arrived at the property where 
the stolen bicycles were  being kept in the back 
yard. Two masked men brandishing guns jumped 
out of the car and started yelling  about the bikes. 
One of men was carrying an assault rifle with a 
silencer. The masked men moved into the  backyard 
where  one of them shot the bike thief in the leg. 
About three weeks after the shooting, the police 
interviewed a witness who had been in the front 
yard when the blue car arrived. The witness said he 
saw the gunmen jump out of the car. They pointed 
their guns at him, shouted “where are  the bikes”, 
and went into the backyard. The  witness told police 
he thought the shooter was the accused. Based 
largely on this identification, the police sought and 
obtained a warrant to search the accused’s home. 
The police subsequently found a number of 
weapons during the search.  The accused was 
charged with aggravated assault, discharging a 
firearm with intent, and several firearms offences.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused challenged the validity of 
the search warrant, arguing that the ITO 
did not accurately capture  the “flavour” 
of the witness’ identification evidence. In 
the accused’s view, there was no credibly based 
information identifying him as the person with the 
assault rifle. Therefore, he submitted there were 
insufficient grounds to issue the search warrant. 
The judge agreed. In applying the reasonable 
grounds standard, the judge found that the 
summary report prepared by the officer taking the 
statement from the  witness did not adequately 
describe the equivocal nature  of those statements. 
The judge found that it was improper for the affiant 
to not verify the reliability of the  information 
contained in the summary provided. The witness’ 
possible  recognition of the accused failed to satisfy 
the reasonable grounds test and therefore there 
were insufficient grounds to issue the warrant. “In 
my view, the statement given to the police  by [the 
witness, ultimately concluding with the following 
phrase, ‘So that’s what made me kind of think that 
maybe it was him,’ suggests to me that perhaps 
[the witness] recognized [the accused], but does 
not provide reasonable grounds with amplification 
for the warrant to have been issued,” said the 
judge. “In the totality of the circumstances, in my 
view, there was not sufficient evidence, on oath, to 
enable me to find reasonable grounds to issue the 
warrant.”
The judge found that the police breached the 
accused’s s. 8 Charter rights because of this 
material non-disclosure that misled the  JJP who 
issued the warrant. The judge nonetheless admitted 
the evidence obtained during the search under s. 
24(2). He found the exclusion of the evidence 
would have a  greater negative effect on the repute 
of justice than its admission.  The accused was 
ultimately acquitted of aggravated assault and 
discharging a firearm with intent because the judge 
concluded the Crown had failed to prove the 
identity of the shooter. But the accused was 
convicted of possessing a firearm while prohibited, 
possessing a loaded firearm, possessing a 
prohibited weapon (brass knuckles) and possessing 
a prohibited device (silencer). 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions arguing that the 
trial judge erred in admitting 
the weapons seized from his 
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residence under s.  24(2) of the  Charter after he 
found the evidence was obtained as a result of a s. 
8 breach. The accused sought an order setting aside 
the convictions. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
trial judge  should not have found a s. 8 breach. The 
Crown argued that the witness’ identification 
evidence along with other circumstantial evidence 
in the  ITO constituted sufficient factual grounds to 
support the issuance of the search warrant. And, 
even if there was a violation, the Crown contended 
there  was no error in admitting the evidence under 
s. 24(2). 
The Reasonable Grounds Standard
Justice Garson, speaking for a  unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found the  trial judge erred in concluding 
that the appropriate standard of proof necessary to 
obtain a search warrant was not satisfied in this 
case. Justice Garson opined that the trial judge 
applied the wrong legal standard:
For the following reasons, I have reached the 
conclusion that the judge took an overly literal 
and narrow approach to [the witness’] 
interview. He applied a standard of proof far 
more demanding than the appropriate standard 
of reasonable probability, which is less 
demanding than proof on a balance of 
probabilities or proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. … In my view, even if the ITO 
exaggerated the certainty of [the witness’] 
identification of [the accused], the record 
before the JJP, as amplified on review, supports 
the issuance of the warrant. [reference omitted, 
para. 31]
The judge erred by isolating and taking literally  one 
phrase (“So that’s what made me kind of think that 
maybe it was him”) from the balance of the 
witness’ interview as conveying uncertainty. He did 
not consider the full context of the interview. 
However, when examined in the totality of the 
interview, the  witness gave reasonably strong 
identification evidence. The judge also failed to 
consider the totality of the other evidence in the 
ITO, particularly  where it supported the 
identification evidence in the witness’ statement: 
As amplified on review, the information the 
police had was more than sufficient to 
conclude there was a reasonable probability 
that [the accused] was the man with the assault 
rifle. In evaluating the probability of the 
existence of facts and inferences, the judge 
failed to apply the correct legal standard in a 
practical, non-technical and common sense 
way. Although he identified the correct legal 
test, he misapplied it. This was an error of law. 
He took a far too literal approach to his 
application of the standard of reasonable 
probability. Specifically, the judge took one part 
of a lengthy statement in isolation and failed to 
consider it in the context of the entire statement 
and the other information revealed in the ITO. 
It would be unreasonable to conclude that the 
police had insufficient information at that stage 
of their investigation to support a reasonable 
probability that the shooter was [the accused]. 
In my view, it would have been illogical for the 
police to reach any other conclusion as to the 
identity of the man with the assault rifle once 
they were in possession of the information in 
the ITO. [para. 35]
The Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge erred 
in finding a s. 8 Charter  breach. The evidence was 
admissible and the accused’s appeal against 
convictions was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“In evaluating the probability of the 
existence of facts and inferences, the 
judge failed to apply the correct legal 
standard in a practical, non-technical and 
common sense way.”
“[The judge] applied a standard of proof 
far more demanding than the appropriate 
standard of reasonable probability, which 
is less demanding than proof on a balance 
of probabilities or proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”
Volume 18 Issue 2 - March/April 2018
PAGE 33
The total percentage by which 
motor vehicle incident deaths 
decreased in British Columbia 
between 2007 and 2016. This 
represented an average  -2.9% decrease year over 
year.
Source: BC Coroners Service, “Motor Vehicle Incident Deaths 2007-2016”, 
released on February 15, 2018. 
... were more likely to be 
killed in a motor vehicle 
incident than any other role. 
In 2016, 140 drivers died. This was 
followed by 65 pedestrians, 41 
passengers, 34 motorcycle or moped 
riders, 11 cyclists and eight (8) 
commercial drivers.
Source: BC Coroners Service, “Motor Vehicle Incident 
Deaths 2007-2016”, released on February 15, 2018. 
... are more 
likely to be 
killed than 
females in motor vehicle 
incidents. In 2016, 214 
males died compared to 
103 females. This is a  ratio 
of more than 2:1.
Source: BC Coroners Service, “Motor Vehicle Incident Deaths 2007-2016”, 
released on February 15, 2018.
... of Canadians agreed that the 
outcome of a case  in the justice 
system depended heavily on how 
good a person’s lawyer was. 
Residents in Atlantic Canada agreed the most (99%), 
followed by Alberta  (90%), Ontario (89%), British 
Columbia (86%), Quebec (81%) and Saskatchewan/
Manitoba (70%). Only 6% of Canadians disagreed 
that the outcome of a case depended on how good a 
lawyer was while 7% were not sure.
Source: Insights West for National Observer, Survey of Canadians on the Justice 
System, February 18, 2018.  
... of Canadians agreed that the 
criminal justice system is too 
soft on offenders. Residents of 
Atlantic Canada agreed the most that the 
system was too soft on offenders at 83%, 
followed by Alberta  (75%), BC (70%), Quebec 
(70%), Ontario (67%) and  Saskatchewan/
Manitoba (67%). 
Source: Insights West for National Observer, Survey of Canadians on 
the Justice System, February 18, 2018.   
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C a n a d a ’s wo r l d 
ranking  in “The 
Human Freedom 
Index 2017.” The Human Freedom Index (HFI) is a 
global measurement of personal and economic 
freedom among 159 countries. It captures the 
degree to which people enjoy major personal 
freedoms (PF) such as civil liberties - freedom of 
speech, religion, association and assembly - and 
economic freedom (EF) such as freedom to trade or 
use sound money. The index uses 79 distinct 
indicators to rank the countries.
Although Canada ranked 11th on the 2017 HFI, it 
should be noted that it has slipped seven spots 
since the last measurements were used. Canada is 
no longer ranked as one of the 10 freest countries. 
This drop in the rankings for Canada compares to 
the United States climbing seven spots and the 
United Kingdom moving up one.
Source: The Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation for Freedom, 2017, “The Human Freedom Index 2017: A Global 
Measurement of Personal, Civil, and Economic Freedom”.
Eleventh
SELECT COUNTRY RANKINGS
HFI 
Ranking
Country PF 
Ranking
EF 
Ranking
1 Switzerland 6 4
2 Hong Kong 26 1
3 New Zealand 9 3
4 Ireland 13 5
5 Australia 11 9
7 Norway 1 25
9 United Kingdom 16 6
11 Canada 14 11
17 United States 24 11
27 Japan 23 29
33 France 31 52
68 South Africa 60 95
73 Mexico 82 76
102 India 103 95
126 Russia 134 100
130 China 136 112
158 Venezuela 127 159
159 Syria 159 153
1
9
17
25
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
9
10 10 10
9
19 19
21
24
17
5 5
4 4
11
Canada
United States
United Kingdom
HFI Rankings
“44 percent of the 
world’s population lives 
in the bottom quartile of 
countries that have low 
levels of freedom.” (p. 25)
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... is Canada’s drug of 
choice. According to 
the Canadian Tobacco, 
Alcohol and Drugs Survey (CTADS), which was 
undertaken in 2015 but posted in 
March 2017, 77% of Canadians 
consumed alcohol in the past year. 
Young adults (20-24) had riskier 
patterns of alcohol consumption 
compared to youth (15-19) and 
adults older than 25. 
... is Canada’s most 
popular illicit drug. 
The CTADS reports 
past-year cannabis use was 12%. The 
median age for initiating cannabis use 
was 17 years of age for both males and 
females.  
Cigarette smoking was at the lowest 
rate  of use ever recorded. In 2015 
the prevalence of cigarette smoking 
was 13%, down from 15% in 2013. 
... of Canadians aged 15 years and 
older reported having ever tried an e-
cigarette. This is up from 9% as 
reported in 2013.
... was the province with the 
highest rate of past year and 
lifetime use of cannabis. More 
than half (51.3%) of British 
Columbians reported having 
used cannabis in their lifetime 
while 17.3% reported past 
year use. Nova Scotia was a 
close second with 51.2% reporting lifetime use 
while 14.4% reported past year use. On the other 
hand, British Columbia had the lowest cigarette 
smoking rate at 10.2% while  Newfoundland had 
the highest smoking rate at  18.5%.
... smoke less, drink less 
and consume illicit drugs 
less often than their male 
counterparts. For example, 65.2% of females 
reported never having smoked a cigarette 
compared to 54.2% of men. As for current 
smoking, 10.4% of females smoke compared to 
15.6% of males. As for cannabis, 37.2% of females 
reported using during their lifetime (52.1% for 
males). Past-year use of cannabis for women was 
9.7% compared to 14.9% for males. Past-year use 
of alcohol was 72.7% for females (81.3% for 
males). Lifetime use of alcohol amongst females 
was 87.7% compared to 94.2% for males. Overall 
use of alcohol for the Canadian population was 
90.7%.
Source: Canadian Tobacco, Alcohol and Drugs Survey (CTADS): 2015 Survey, 
corrections posted March 2017.
Alcohol
Cannabis
Tobacco
13%
DRUG USE BY AGE
Drug 15-19
Youth
20-24
Young Adult
25+
Adult
Alcohol
- past year use
59% 83% 78%
Illicit Drugs*
- past year use
21% 31% 10%
Illicit Drugs 
(excludes cannabis)
- past year use
5% 9% 1%
Cannabis
- past year use
21% 30% 10%
Current Cigarette 
Smoking
10% 18% 13%
Tobacco Use**
- past 30 day use
13% 24% 15%
e-Cigarettes
- ever tried
26% 30% 11%
* Illicit drugs surveyed were (1) cannabis, (2) cocaine or crack, (3)
ecstasy, (4) speed or methamphetamines, (5) hallucinogens, or (6) 
heroin.
** Tobacco use includes the use of a number of tobacco products 
including cigarettes, cigars, little cigars or cigarillos, smokeless tobacco, 
water-pipe and pipes.
British Columbia Females
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... was the highest 
letter grade received 
by a province in the 
MacDonald-Laurier Institute’s 
“Report Card on the 
Criminal Justice System 
#2” released in March 2018. 
The report card measured a 
number of strengths and weaknesses of the criminal 
justice system in each province  and territory. 
Metrics used included headings of public safety, 
support for victims, costs and resources, fairness, 
and access and efficiency. 
Several of the individual metrics used to grade the 
provinces and territories were related directly to the 
police. These metrics included the following:
• Police effectiveness at enforcing the law;
• Police effectiveness at ensuring safety;
• Perception of police supplying information;
• Perception of police being approachable;
• Police per 100,000 population;
• Perception of police being fair; 
• Confidence in police; and
• Police responding properly.
B 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT CARDProvince/
Territory
2017
Rank
2017 
Grade
2016 
Rank
2016
Grade
PEI 1 B 1 B+
NB 2 B 3 B
NF 3 B 2 B
ON 4 B 7 C+
NS 5 B 5 B
QC 6 B 4 B
AB 7 B 6 C+
NU 8 C+ 10 C+
SK 9 C+ 9 C+
BC 10 C+ 8 C+
MB 11 C 12 C
NWT 12 C 11 C
YT 13 C 13 C
SELECT INDIVIDUAL METRIC LETTER GRADE GRID BY PROVINCE
METRIC BC AB SK MB ON QC NF NS NB PEI
Police effective at enforcing 
the law
C C+ D D B+ A+ C+ C+ B+ B+
Police effective at ensuring 
safety
C C+ D F B+ A B+ C+ B+ A
Police supplying information D C+ D D C+ B+ A C+ B+ A
Police being approachable C C C+ D C+ D A B B+ A+
Number of police per 
100,000 population
C+ B+ D C C+ C B+ C B+ A+
Confidence in police D B B+ C+ C+ D A+ C+ B+ C
Perception of police being 
fair
D C C D C+ B+ B+ C+ A A+
Criminal Code incidents per 
police officer
B+ B+ A B+ D D C+ C C C+
Police responding promptly C+ C+ D F B+ A C+ B B+ A
Source : MacDonald-
Laurier Institute, “Report 
Card on the Criminal 
Jus t ice Sys tem #2”, 
March 2018.
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The proportion of opioid users 
in the  Downtown Eastside of 
Vancouver who tested positive 
for fentanyl in 2017. This was 
up from just 45% five months earlier. This 2017 
five-month study examined the presence of fentanyl 
in people residing in marginal housing in the 
Downtown Eastside. People enrolled in opioid 
addiction treatment programs were also tested and 
more than half of them tested positive for fentanyl, 
indicating they sometimes seek out other more 
potent drugs. The study was funded by the 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research and BC 
Mental Health and Substances Use Services.
Source: “Fentanyl overwhelms opioid drug market in Vancouver’s Downtown 
Eastside”, February 1, 2018.
The number of visits to 
Insite from January 1 to 
December 31, 2017. Insite 
is North America’s first legalized supervised drug 
injection site. Other user statistics include:
• 7,301 individual users;
• An average of 537 visits per day to the  needle 
exchange service;
• An average of 415 injection room visits per day;
• 2,151 overdose interventions;
• 3,708 clinical treatment interventions (such as 
wound care, pregnancy tests);
• Substances reportedly used:
• heroin (64% of instances);
• methamphetamine (25% of instances); and
• cocaine (6% of instances).
• 28% of participants were women;
• 18% of participants were Indigenous;
• For the fiscal year 2017/18 443 clients accessed 
Onsite, the adjoining detox treatment facility, 
with an average stay of 11 days; and  
• More than 3.6 million clients have  injected 
illicit drugs under supervision by nurses at Insite 
since 2003.  There have been 48,798 clinical 
treatment visits and 6,440 overdose interventions 
without any deaths.
Source: “Insite User Statistics”, January 1 - December 31, 2017. 
The percentage increase of 
Alberta accidental poisoning 
(overdose) deaths related to 
carfentanil, a sub category of 
fentanyl. In 2017 there were 159 deaths related to 
carfentanil, up from 30 in 2016. As well, deaths 
related to fentanyl reached 562 in 2017, up from 
358 in 2016. 
The most up-to-date data shows that 687 people 
died in Alberta from an apparent accidental opioid 
overdose in 2017. This is almost two people dying 
every day. 
• From January 1 - December 31, 2017, 81% of 
deaths occurred in large urban areas such as 
Calgary, Edmonton, Red Deer, Lethbridge, 
Medicine, Grande Prairie and Fort McMurray.
• 80% of accidental overdose deaths related to 
fentanyl were among males. 54% of accidental 
overdose deaths related to an opioid other than 
fentanyl were among males.
Source: Alberta Health. “Opioids and Substances of Misuse: Alberta Report, 
2017 Q4”, March 2, 2018. 
In the first 6 weeks of 2018, 74 individuals have 
died from a fentanyl overdose, up 32% from 56 
during the same period in 2017.
Source: Alberta Health. “Opioids and Substances of Misuse: Alberta Q1 
Interim Report 2018”, April 5, 2018. 
100%
175,464
430%
0
175
350
525
700
2016 2017
159
30
562
358
687
559
opioids fentanyl carfentanil
OVERDOSES BY DRUG
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... GX 460 4 door 
AWD SUV was 
the top vehicle 
stolen in Canada in 2017 according to the 
Insurance Bureau of Canada. Their annual list of the 
Top 10 Stolen Vehicles 
in Canada is based on 
actual insurance claims 
da ta col lec ted f rom 
nearly  all automobile 
insurance companies in 
Canada.
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada, “Top 10 Stolen Vehicles”, accessed on 
April 11, 2018. 
The estimated 
2017 dol lar 
loss of Online 
Purchase Scams in Canada, so says the Better 
Business Bureau (BBB). In February 2018, the  BBB 
released its list of the Top 10 Scams of 2017. 
According to its press 
release, “scammers 
bilked Canadians of 
over 95 million dollars 
in 2017 and, once 
again, it’s believed that 
only 5% of those victimized actually come forward 
to report losses. Taking that into account, the actual 
losses quickly balloon to the range of $2 billion 
dollars.”
Source: Better Business Bureau of Canada, “Top 10 Scams”, accessed on 
April 11, 2018. 
...was the top contributing 
factor in British Columbia’s 
2016 fatal crashes. This was 
followed by impairment and distraction. 
Source: ICBC, “Quick Statistics”, updated December 2017, 2018. 
2015 Lexus
Canada’s Top 10 Stolen Vehicles - 2017
Rank Vehicle
1 2015 LEXUS GX460 4DR AWD SUV
2 2007 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
3 2006 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
4 2005 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
5 2001 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
6 2003 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
7 2004 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
8 2016 TOYOTA 4RUNNER 4DR 4WD SUV
9 2002 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
10 2006 FORD F250 SD 4WD PU
$13 Million
Canada’s Top 10 Scams - 2017
Rank Vehicle
1 Online Purchase Scam
2 Wire Fraud / Spearphishing
3 Romance Scam
4 Employment Scam
5 Cryptocurrency Scam
6 Income Tax Scam
7 Miracle Weight-loss Scam
8 Advance Fee Loans
9 Shady Contractors
10 Fake Invoices
Speed
20%
25%
30%
22%
28%
30%
Speed Impaired Distraction
Top Contributing Factors in Fatal Crashes - 2016
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NO PRIVACY INTEREST IN 
MESSAGES SENT TO POLICE 
USING THIRD PARTY’s PHONE
R. v. Beairsto, 2018 ABCA 118
 
The police arrested a man named 
Ahmed (also known as “Ricardo”) 
during a drug investigation. In the 
course  of Amhed’s arrest, the police 
seized a Blackberry cell phone from the driver’s 
side door of his vehicle. The cell phone did not 
require a password, was not otherwise locked, and 
was open to a Blackberry messenger chat between 
the phone’s user and an individual named “Dobes 
Red Rum,” later determined to be  the accused. A 
text conversation indicative of drug trafficking was 
captured and downloaded by police and retained 
as evidence. In an effort to download the messages, 
a police officer added a police Blackberry number 
to the text conversations. The police number that 
had been added as a  third party then received a 
text message from “Dobes” asking “who’s that?”
The police off icer 
portrayed himself as 
an associate of Ahmed 
who was involved in 
the drug trade. In 
further conversation 
with “Dobes” using 
the police Blackberry, 
the officer pretended 
to be “a buddy” of 
A m h e d n a m e d 
“Hunter”. Because the 
p o l i c e r e t a i n e d 
Ahmed’s Blackberry, 
they were able  to 
confirm that “Dobes” had attempted to discover 
“who is Hunter?” by sending a text to Ahmed’s 
Blackberry. The officer then used Ahmed’s cell 
phone to confirm the relationship. Thereafter, 
“Hunter” (an undercover police  officer designated a 
public officer for the purpose of ss. 25.1-25.4 of the 
Criminal Code), impersonated Ahmed and engaged 
in an exchange of text messages with “Dobes” 
using both Ahmed’s Blackberry and his police cell 
phone over a five day period.
The accused ultimately shipped a kilogram of 
cocaine from Vancouver to a police intercept 
address in Edmonton. Arrangements through text 
exchanges were then made to send $40,000 by 
UPS in payment for the cocaine. A controlled 
delivery of a weighted parcel (with no money) was 
made to the accused at his Vancouver address. He 
took delivery of the UPS package after producing a 
BC driver’s license to confirm his identity. He was 
arrested for drug trafficking and, on being searched 
incidental to arrest, was found to possess three 
Blackberry cell phones, one of which had the same 
number to which “Hunter” was texting messages to 
“Dobes” to order the cocaine. A search warrant was 
also executed on his residence and police 
recovered residency documents, 1.5 kilograms of 
cocaine, scales, seven cellphones, a  money counter 
and $8,185 is cash. He was charged with cocaine 
trafficking.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused conceded that the initial 
search of Ahmed’s Blackberry was a 
lawful search incident to Ahmed’s arrest. 
However, he sought to exclude the text 
messages he sent to police after Ahmed’s arrest 
based on alleged breaches of ss. 7 and 8 of the 
The Electronic Exchange
Time Sender Message
7:00 am Dobes “Who’s that?”
10:20 am Police 
Officer
“I am a buddy of Ricardo”
10:25 am Dobes “Oh. Whats. Up bro”
10:27 am Police 
Officer
“Not. Much wanted da recipe 
that’s all”
“Who are u?”
10:28 am Dobes “I’m. His. Pal. From Van. What 
recipe. Bro?”
10:29 am Police 
Officer
“The. Coke and soda one”
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Charter arising from the use of the cell phones by 
police. The judge concluded that, in the particular 
circumstances of this case, the accused did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to the text messages he sent after Ahmed's 
arrest. Furthermore, the police use of the phones to 
engage in the text exchanges with the accused, 
without obtaining a Part VI authorization under the 
Criminal Code, did not amount to a  Charter breach. 
Nor did the failure of police to obtain a general 
warrant. Finally, even if the judge was wrong in 
finding no Charter breaches, he would not have 
excluded the evidence under s. 24(2). The accused 
was convicted of cocaine trafficking and sentenced 
to five and a half years in prison less time served. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in finding that 
t h e h e d i d n o t h ave a 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy respecting the text messages he sent to 
Ahmed. As well, he asserted that the police 
intercepted his private communications when they 
used Ahmed’s phone to exchange text messages 
with him, which required prior judicial 
authorization. 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In determining whether an accused has a basis for 
standing to challenge the search of another person’s 
cell phone and the electronic discussion therein, a 
Court must assess whether the accused had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the electronic 
discussion and whether that expectation was 
objectively reasonable. Lack of control over a cell 
phone is no longer dispositive of whether a person 
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Relying on R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, the Court 
of Appeal noted that text messages sent and 
received can, in some cases, attract a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. “The totality of the 
circumstances, inclusive of the following, will 
determine whether s. 8 Charter protection will be 
engaged,”  stated the Appeal Court. “The claimant 
must establish (a) a direct interest in the subject 
matter of the search, (b) a  subjective expectation 
of privacy in that subject matter, and (c) that the 
subjective expectation of privacy was objectively 
reasonable. If the  latter factor is not made out, 
s tanding to argue that the  search was 
unreasonable will be rejected.”
In describing the objective analysis, the Court of 
Appeal stated:
Objective reasonableness of an expectation of 
privacy will be determined,  inter alia, on the 
basis of (a) the place where the search occurred 
(the subject matter of the search is the 
electronic conversation i tsel f , not i ts 
components. The place may be a real physical 
place or a metaphorical chat room) (b) Whether 
the electronic conversation reveals details of 
the claimant’s lifestyle or information of a 
biographic nature (c) whether the claimant, at 
the material time, exercised control over the 
conversational information.
“The totality of the circumstances, inclusive of the following, will determine whether s. 
8 Charter protection will be engaged. The claimant must establish (a) a direct interest in the 
subject matter of the search, (b) a subjective expectation of privacy in that subject matter, 
and (c) that the subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable. If the latter 
factor is not made out, standing to argue that the search was unreasonable will be rejected.”
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Critical to a consideration of the latter factor, 
loss of control does not inevitably follow from 
possession of the conversational information by 
another person nor by a third party’s ability to 
access that information or disclose it. Put 
another way, exclusive control is not a 
condition precedent to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, safe from state scrutiny. 
One may now confidently assert that binding 
precedent has now rejected the proposition that 
the sending of an electronic message 
constitutes a complete relinquishment of 
control over who may view the contents 
thereby extinguishing all expectation of privacy. 
[para. 13-14] 
However, in this case, the Court of Appeal was 
unwilling to recognize the accused’s asserted 
expectation of privacy as “reasonable”:
There is a complete absence of evidence, 
testimony or otherwise, that the [accused] 
expected Ahmed to keep their messages 
private. Unlike the facts in Marakah where on 
numerous occasions the accused had asked his 
accomplice to delete their text messages from 
his phone, thereby supporting a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the 
accomplice’s phone which was also objectively 
reasonable, the factual matrix in the case at bar 
lends no such support. [para. 27]
Nor was there any evidence  to support a subjective 
expectation of privacy in relation to copies of sent 
text messages located on Ahmed’s cell phone. The 
accused chose not to testify on the vior dire. He 
bore the burden of establishing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, which he failed to do.
Interception
Under s. 183 of the Criminal Code, an interception 
is defined as to include “listen to, record or acquire 
a communication or acquire the substance, 
meaning or purport thereof.” However, the Court of 
Appeal found that the  deception of an individual as 
to the identity of their interlocutor through the use 
of electronic communications, does not amount to 
an interception: 
... Simply put, as I see it, deception does not 
amount to an interception.
In my view, it is important to distinguish 
between the disclosure of found private 
communications and the interception of same. 
Where an investigation involves a basic 
deception as to whom the [accused] is 
communicating with, absent intrusive 
technologies amounting to an “interference” 
between the recipient and the sender, no 
interception is made out. In  R. v. Mills,  2017 
NLCA 12 the Newfoundland Court of Appeal 
held that where there is direct communication 
between two parties, deception as to the 
identity of the recipient does not alter the 
nature of the communication or transform the 
“receipt by the intended recipient into an 
interception” ... . I respectfully agree. [para. 25]
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Beairsto, 2016 ABQB 216 and R v. Beairsto, 2017 
ABCA 225.
“Objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy will be determined, inter alia, on the 
basis of (a) the place where the search occurred (the subject matter of the search is the 
electronic conversation itself, not its components. The place may be a real physical place or 
a metaphorical chat room) (b) Whether the electronic conversation reveals details of the 
claimant’s lifestyle or information of a biographic nature (c) whether the claimant, at the 
material time, exercised control over the conversational information.”
“Simply put, as I see it, deception does not amount to an interception. In my view, it is 
important to distinguish between the disclosure of found private communications and the 
interception of same.”
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NWT
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2,340
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2,572
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15,884
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911
PEI
222
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1,831
NB
1,234In 2016/17 the total expenditure on policing was
$14,669,412,000
RCMP ‘HQ’ & 
Training Academy
1,159
CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 407
Quebec Provincial Police
 5,399
Ontario Provincial Police
 6,040
Canada’s Police Officers by City - Top 10
CMA Officers % Change
Number per 100,000 2016>2017
Toronto, ON 5,190 180 -4.9%
Montreal, QC 4,596 228 -0.9%
Calgary,  AB 2,215 168 -0.4%
Peel Region,  ON 1,973 140 -2.0%
Edmonton,  AB 1,775 183 -0.2%
York Region, ON 1,586 137 -2.4%
Winnipeg, MB 1,409 192 -2.6%
Vancouver, BC 1,313 196 0.0%
Ottawa, ON 1,242 128 -1.5%
Durham Region, ON 854 127 -2.3%
POLICING ACROSS CANADA: 
FACTS & FIGURES
According to a  recent report 
released by Statistics Canada, 
there  were 69,027 active police 
officers across Canada in 2017. 
This represented an increase of 
168 officers from the previous 
year. Ontario had the most police officers at 25,981, 
while Nunavut had the least at 134. With a national 
population of 36,708,083, Canada’s average cop per 
pop ratio was 188 police officers per 100,000 residents. 
Total population: 36,708,083
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 
2017, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, March 28 2018
2017
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2017 FAST FACTS
• On the snapshot day of May 15, 2017 there 
were 69,027 police officers in Canada. There 
were an additional 29,049 civilians, which 
represented 30% of all police  personnel. There 
were 2.4 officers for every civilian employed.  
• Saskatchewan had the highest provincial rate of 
police strength at 201 officers per 100,000 
residents (cop to pop ratio) followed closely by 
Manitoba and Nova Scotia both at 192 officers 
per 100,000. The Northwest Territories had the 
highest territorial cop to pop ratio at 411 officers 
per 100,000.
• 56% of police officers were 40 years of age or 
older. 
• 66% of OPP officers were over the age of 40.
• For municipal police services serving a 
population of 100,000 or more, Victoria BC had 
the highest police strength at 233 officers per 
100,000, followed by Montreal, QC (228) and 
Halifax, NS (223). Richmond, BC had the lowest 
police strength at 98 officers per 100,000. 
• For 2016/2017, 86% of officers hired were 
recruits. The remainder were experienced police 
officers.
• Police expenditures continue to rise, more than 
doubling since 2000.
• Per capita costs for policing in fiscal 2016/2017 
translated to $315 per Canadian.
• Provincial police services in Ontario, Quebec 
and Newfoundland cost $2.2 billion.
• Stand alone municipal services cost $7.7 billion.
• The total operating costs for the RCMP 
amounted to $4.8 billion.
RETIREMENT
At the end of the 
2016/2017, 10% of 
police officers were 
eligible to retire. 
Manitoba had the 
highest proportion of officers that could retire at 
19%. This was followed by Newfoundland and 
Labrador (17%) and the Yukon (16%). Forty one 
percent (41%) of officers at RCMP Headquarters 
and the Training Academy could retire.
Top 10 Retirement Eligible          
Municipal Police Services 
Municipal Police Service Eligible to Retire %
Winnipeg, MB 25.8%
St. John’s, NL 24%
Codiac Region (Moncton) NB 21.8%
Victoria, BC 21.4%
Hamilton, ON 19.0%
Montreal, QC 16.3%
Levis, QC 13.1%
Kelowna, BC 12.4%
Guelph, ON 10.9%
GENDER
There were 14,752 female officers on May 15, 
2017 accounting  for 21% of all officers, or 
roughly 1 in 5. This is up 197 more female officers 
from the previous year. The Royal Newfoundland 
Constabulary reported the highest proportion of 
female officers at 28%. The Ontario Provincial 
Police and the Sûreté du Québec each reported 
22% of their officers as 
female while the RCMP and 
municipal s tand-alone 
police services (excluding 
F i r s t N a t i o n s ) , e a c h 
reported 21% of officers as 
female. The  First Nation 
self-administered services 
accounted for 16% of 
female officers. 
Senior officers, such as 
chie f s , deputy chie fs , 
superintendents, inspectors 
and other equivalent ranks, 
were 15% female. Non-
commissioned officers, 
such as sergeants, were 
19% female. Constables 
were 23% female.
City % 
Fem
Longueuil, QC 34.7
Montreal, QC 32.1
Kelowna, BC 31.8
Laval, QC 30.0
St. John’s, NL 28.7
Quebéc, QC 27.2
Terrebonne, QC 27.2
Coquitlam, BC 26.4
Victoria, BC 25.4
Vancouver, BC 25.3
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RCMP
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. It is divided into 15 Divisions 
with Headquarters in Ottawa. Each 
division is managed by a commanding 
officer and is designated alphabetically. 
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of January 1, 2018
Rank # of positions
Commissioner 1
Deputy Commissioners 5
Assistant Commissioners 31
Chief Superintendents 59
Superintendents 189
Inspectors 333
Corps Sergeant Major 1
Sergeants Major 7
Staff Sergeants Major 14
Staff Sergeants 835
Sergeants 1,956
Corporals 3,543
Constables 11,691
Special Constables 114
Civilian Members 3,709
Public Service Employees 7,083
Total 29,571
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
RCMP Officers by Type of Policing - Canada 2017 (numbers do not include 1,159 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Contract 5,529 2,669 1,024 819 - - 659 795 97 409 111 163 123 12,398
Federal & 
Other
870 430 247 176 1,652 882 135 151 27 95 17 20 11 4,713
Total 6,399 3,099 1,271 995 1,652 882 794 946 124 504 128 183 134 17,111
RCMP DIVISIONS
Division Area
Depot Regina, SK (Training Academy)
National National Capital Region
B Newfoundland & Labrador
C Quebec
D Manitoba
E British Columbia
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
K Alberta
L Prince Edward Island
M Yukon Territory
O Ontario
V Nunavut Territory
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 2017, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, March 28 2018
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Canadian Association of Police Educators
The Canadian Association of Police Educators (CAPE) promotes excellence in law enforcement 
training and education through the guidance of innovative research, program development, 
knowledge transfer, network facilitation, and collaborative training initiatives. The objectives of 
CAPE include:
• Providing advice and input regarding national and regional law enforcement training and 
education trends/needs.
• Advocating and promoting the commitment to training.
• Advising on training specific policy.
• Liaising between operational training academies and academic institutions.
• Guiding and undertaking law enforcement training and education research.
• Coordinating knowledge transfer initiatives.
Presentation topics at the 2018 CAPE Conference include:
✓ Police Research in Canada
✓ Professionalization of Policing
✓ Applying rResearch on Targeted Violence to the Practice of Threat Management in 
Communities: A US Perspective
✓ Problem Based Learning for Policing
✓ Practical Applications of Police Use of Force Research
✓ Evidence Based Policing
✓ Simulators and Bridging the Gap Between Research and Police Training
This conference also provides an opportunity to network and exchange ideas.
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JUSTICE SYSTEM CONFIDENCE: 
POLICE TAKE TOP SPOTS
According to a recent Angus Reid Institute research 
poll, more people had confidence in the police 
than in the court system. When people were asked 
how much confidence they had in the various 
elements of the Canadian justice  system, the 
provincial police forces in Ontario and Quebec 
were at the top (67%), followed by their local 
police (municipal or RCMP detachment) (63%), the 
RCMP (62%), the Supreme Court of Canada (51%) 
and finally provincial criminal courts (41%). 
Confidence varied across the regions with Atlantic 
Canada having the lowest confidence in the RCMP 
(55%) and local police (47%) while British 
Columbia had the least confidence in its provincial 
criminal courts (28%). Manitobans had the least 
confidence in the Supreme Court of Canada (35%).
Quebec had the highest confidence in the RCMP 
(68%) while Saskatchewan had the most 
confidence in their local municipal or RCMP 
detachment (67%). Quebec also had the highest 
confidence in its provincial criminal courts and the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
41%
51%
62%63%
67%
Provincial Police Local Police
RCMP Supreme Court
Provincial Court
How much confidence do you have in each of 
these elements of the criminal justice system?
Region Provincial 
Police 
(ON & 
QC only)
Local 
police 
(municipal 
or RCMP 
detachment)
RCMP Supreme 
Court of 
Canada
Provincial 
criminal 
courts
BC - 62% 56% 43% 28%
AB - 63% 67% 41% 36%
SK - 67% 61% 39% 38%
MB - 57% 60% 35% 33%
ON 60% 64% 60% 56% 44%
QC 68% 66% 68% 59% 50%
ATL - 47% 55% 45% 29%
Total 67% 63% 62% 51% 41%
Public Confidence
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Overall, confidence in the criminal justice system 
has declined slightly  over the 2016 survey results 
but has improved significantly since the 2012 
survey.
OTHER FAST FACTS
• People identifying as visible minorities were less 
likely to have confidence in the police, whether 
the RCMP, provincial or local police. 
• 42% of Canadians reported an increase in 
crime where they lived in the last five years 
while 7%  said crime decreased during that time 
period. The remaining people saw no change 
(39%) or were unsure (12%).
• 13% of Canadians reported they have been a 
victim of crime within the past two years that 
was reported to the police. Those reporting being 
victimized were highest in Saskatchewan (19%) 
and lowest in Quebec (7%). 
• 60% of Canadians agreed that the criminal 
courts do a good job in determining whether or 
not an accused person is guilty. This was highest 
in Ontario and Quebec (each at 62%) and lowest 
in Atlantic Canada (49%).
• Only  37% of Canadians agreed the justice 
system treats everyone fairly. This was highest 
in Quebec (50%) and lowest in Saskatchewan 
(22%).
• 46% of Canadians agreed that judges do a 
good job handing out punishments and 
sentences to people who commit crimes. This 
was lowest in British Columbia (34%) and 
highest in Quebec (52%).
• 37% of Canadians believed the primary purpose 
of prison is to protect the public from 
dangerous criminals. 33% of people believed 
the primary purpose of prison was to punish law 
breakers,  followed by rehabilitating criminals 
so they can re-enter society (14%) and to 
discourage others from committing crimes 
(13%). 
• 62% of Canadians though the justice system was 
too soft in dealing  with law breakers while 
only  4% felt the system was too harsh with 
criminals. Only 25% thought the system struck 
the right balance while  the remaining 9% 
couldn’t say.
Local Police
RCMP
Provincial Courts
Supreme Court
15%
26%
37%
48%
59%
70%
2012 2014 2016 2018
31%
48%
57%
51%
19%
40%
44%
41%
38%
67%
66%
62%
39%
63%
65%
63%
Source: Angus Reid Institute, “Confidence in the justice 
system: Visible minorities have less faith in courts than other 
Canadians”, February 20, 2018.
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2018
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2008 to February 28, 
2018. In February there were  102 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This represents a 19% decrease 
over the  number of deaths occurring in February 
2017. This amounts to about seven (7) people dying 
every two (2) days of the month.
There were  a total of 228 illicit drug overdose 
deaths in January and February 2018. This is a 
-15% decrease over the same period last year.
The 1,446 overdose deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 334% over 2013. Moreover, the report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2018 with 60 illicit drug overdose deaths followed 
by 19-29 year-olds at 52 deaths. People aged 40-49 
year-olds and 50-59 year-olds had 47 deaths each.. 
Vancouver had the most deaths at 52 followed by 
Surrey (36), Victoria (20), Kamloops (9), Kelowna 
(9) and Prince George (9). 
Males continue to die at almost a 5:1 ratio 
compared to females. In 2018, 185 males have 
died while there were 43 female deaths.
90
97
104
111
118
125
February 2017 February 2018
102
122
200
225
250
275
Jan-Feb 2017 Jan-Feb 2018
228
268
-19%
-15%
19%
81%
Males
Females
Deaths by gender
0
1
2
3
4
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
0.7 0.9
1.0
1.4
2.7
4.0 3.9
Daily Average
illicit Drug Overdose Deaths
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The 2018 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (91%) occurred inside while 9% 
occurred outside. For three (3) deaths, the location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 21 months preceding the 
declaration (May 2014-Mar 2016) totaled 992. The 
number of deaths in the 23 months following the 
declaration (April 2016-Feb 2018) totaled 2,445. 
This is an increase of 146%.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug 
overdose deaths from 2016 and 2017 were 
fentanyl, which was detected in 71.0% of deaths, 
cocaine (48.7%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(33.0%), and heroin (28.5%). 
Vancouver
Surrey
Victoria
Kelowna
Burnaby
Kamloops
Langley
New Westminster
Prince George
0 80 160 240 320 400
8
7
6
9
7
8
20
36
52
22
24
36
39
44
75
91
176
365
2017 2018
Illicit Drug 
Overdose Deaths 
by Township with 6 or 
more deaths
in 2018
31812
52
143
Private Residence
Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
(Jan-Feb)
Source: 
-Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2008 to February 
28, 2018.  
Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. April 5, 2018.
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OPIOID awareness in Canada
Opioids are typically pain medications, mostly available by prescription.  Some of
the most commonly known opioids are fentanyl, OxyContin, morphine and codeine.
Source: Survey on Opioid Awareness, 2017 
Level of Awareness
by province or
territory
Somewhat
aware
Very
aware
Not at all 
aware
www.canada.ca/opioids
For further information on opioids, please visit the following website:
I would recognize the signs of an opioid
overdose
Agree
28%
Neither agree 
or disagree
22%
Disagree
51%
Percentage of Canadians who
agreed they would know how to:
Obtain
Naloxone
Both obtain
and administer
Naloxone
Administer
Naloxone
Did you know?
Drugs obtained illegally
or on the street have the
potential to contain
Very aware Not at all
 aware
Somewhat
aware
fentanyl.
71%
15%14%
Of those, more than 1 in 4  have 
left-over opioids being stored in the home.
Fentanyl is a medication used to relieve pain that is about 100 times 
more potent than morphine
Naloxone is a life-saving medication that can stop or reverse
an opioid overdose, however, the results are temporary
Adverse effects
of mixing
opioids with
other
medication
Very aware
72
Somewhat aware
Not at all aware
10
18
Opioid issue awareness
by province
7%
10%
15%
48%
38%
14%
54%
27%
18%
50%
18%
33%
52%
26%
22%
54%
26%
19%
55%
23%
22%54%
30%
16%
Atlantic provinces 
Level of
awareness
%
%
%
3 in 10 Canadians aged 18 and over 
reported using some form of opioid in the 
past 5 years.
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BC CROWN COUNSEL UPDATES 
ITS CHARGE ASSESSMENT 
GUIDELINES
The BC Prosecut ion 
Service updated its 2009 
c h a r g e a s s e s s m e n t 
guidelines on March 1, 
2018. The new guideline 
caution Crown Counsel 
“against becoming too closely connected to the 
police or doing anything else to hamper their ability 
to conduct objective charge assessments.”
Charging Standard
The charge assessment standard involves a two-part 
test:
1. whether there is a substantial likelihood of 
conviction.
2. whether the  public interest requires a 
prosecution.
Evidentiary Test
The evidentiary test is whether there is a 
substantial likelihood of conviction:
The reference to “likelihood” requires, at a 
minimum, that a conviction according to law is 
more likely than an acquittal. In this context, 
“substantial” refers not only to the probability 
of conviction but also to the objective strength 
or solidity of the evidence. A substantial 
likelihood of conviction exists if Crown 
Counsel is satisfied there is a strong and solid 
case of substance to present to the court. 
In determining whether this test is satisfied, 
Crown Counsel must consider the following 
factors: 
• what material evidence is likely to be 
admissible and available at a trial
• the objective reliability of the admissible 
evidence
• whether there are viable defences, or other 
legal or constitutional impediments to the 
prosecution, that remove any substantial 
likelihood of a conviction.
In assessing the evidence, Crown Counsel 
should assume that the trial will unfold before 
an impartial and unbiased judge or jury acting 
in accordance with the law, and should not 
usurp the role of the judge or jury by 
substituting their own subjective view of the 
ultimate weight or credibility of evidence for 
those of the judge or jury. [p. 2]
Public Interest Test
If the Crown is satisfied that the evidentiary test is 
met, then the Crown must determine whether the 
public interest requires a prosecution. Justice  does 
not require  that every provable  offence be tried and 
the policy reserves prosecution for those cases 
requiring the full force of the criminal justice 
system. If, on the other hand, there are reasonable 
alternatives available, they should be pursued. 
In assessing public interest, the policy  requires 
Crown Counsel to consider and weigh a number of 
factors relevant to any particular case.
Public Interest Factors that Weigh in Favour 
of Prosecution 
• the seriousness of the allegations;
• the likelihood of significant sentence upon 
conviction the seriousness of the harm caused to 
a victim;
• the use, or threatened use, of a weapon; 
• the relative vulnerability of the victim;
• the alleged offender’s history of relevant previous 
convictions or previous allegations that resulted 
in alternative measures;
• the alleged offender’s position of authority or 
trust in relation to the victim evidence of 
premeditation; 
• evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, 
prejudice, or hate based on colour, race, 
religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, 
sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 
mental or physical disability, or any other similar 
factor;
EVIDENTIARY TEST
PUBLIC INTEREST TEST
Volume 18 Issue 2 - March/April 2018
PAGE 54
• a significant difference between the actual or 
mental ages of the alleged offender and the 
victim 
• that the alleged offender was under an order of 
the court at the time of the offence;
• the presence of reasonable grounds for believing 
the offence is likely to be continued or repeated; 
• the offence occurs frequently  in the location 
where it was committed;
• the offence is one that affects the integrity, safety, 
or security of the justice system or its 
participants ;
• the offence is a terrorism offence; and/or
• the offence was committed for the benefit of, at 
the direction of, or in association with a criminal 
organization.
Public Interest Factors that Weigh Against 
Prosecution 
• a conviction is likely  to result in an insignificant 
penalty; 
• the public interest has been or can be served 
without a prosecution by the BC Prosecution 
Service, including through alternative measures, 
administrative  or civil processes, or a 
prosecution by another prosecuting authority; 
• the offence was committed as a result of a 
genuine mistake or misunderstanding of fact the 
loss or harm was the  result of a single incident 
and was minor in nature; 
• the alleged offender’s lack of history of relevant 
previous convictions or recent previous 
allegations that resulted in alternative measures; 
• the offence is of a trivial or technical nature; and/
or
• the law giving rise to the offence is obsolete or 
obscure.
Public Interest Factors that May Weigh 
Either in Favour of or Against a Prosecution 
• the youth, age, intelligence, physical health, 
mental health, or other personal circumstances 
of a witness or victim; 
• the personal circumstances of the accused;
• the alleged offender’s degree of culpability  in 
relation to other parties;
• the length and expense of a prosecution when 
considered in relation to the social benefit to be 
gained by it;
• the time which has elapsed since the offence was 
committed; and/or
• the need to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice.
Exceptional Evidentiary Test 
In some cases, described as exceptional 
circumstances, the relevant public  interest factors 
may weigh so heavily in favour of a prosecution 
that it will be necessary to resort to a lower charge 
assessment standard of a reasonable prospect of 
conviction in order to maintain public  confidence 
in the administration of criminal justice. Thus, a 
charge may still be approved even though the usual 
evidentiary test of a substantial likelihood of 
conviction is not met:
A reasonable prospect of conviction requires 
more than just “some evidence” on each 
essential element of an alleged offence but it 
does not require that a conviction be more 
likely than an acquittal. The term “reasonable” 
means based on reason; rational; objective, as 
opposed to subjective. “Prospect” is forward-
looking. It involves the expectation of a 
potential outcome, informed by previous 
experience and common sense. A “reasonable 
prospect of conviction” exists if experienced 
Crown Counsel, informed of all the relevant 
facts, is satisfied there is a rational and realistic 
basis for obtaining a conviction according to 
law. [p. 5]
In determining whether the reasonable prospect of 
conviction test is satisfied the following factors 
must be considered:
• what material evidence is arguably admissible 
and available at a trial;
• the  objective reliability of the admissible 
evidence; and
• whether the evidence is overborne by any 
incontrovertible defence.
Source: British Columbia Prosecution Service, Crown Counsel 
Policy Manual, Charge Assessment Guidelines, CHA 1, March 1, 
2018
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GROUNDS NOT TO BE 
DISSECTED & ISOLATED TO 
MINIMIZE THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
R. v. Duong, 2018 SKCA 25
A police officer, in company a drug 
sniffing dog, was parked at the side of 
the TransCanada Highway. He clocked 
the accused’s vehicle on radar 
travelling 116 km/h in a 110 km/h zone. The officer 
pulled onto the highway and followed the 
accused’s vehicle for three to five kilometers, 
querying its licence plate on the police computer. 
Although the vehicle was driven in a normal 
manner, the police computer generated three hits: 
(1) a conviction for cultivation; (2) a conditional 
discharge for an offence of which the officer was 
unaware; and (3) the vehicle was linked to a 
prohibited driver. Because of the third hit, the 
officer decided to pull the  vehicle over and check 
the driver’s status. 
The officer went to the passenger side of the 
vehicle. The officer noted that the accused, who 
was the sole  occupant of the vehicle, appeared to 
be very  nervous. His hand was trembling, he 
fumbled with the power switch of the passenger 
side window and his face was sweaty. When asked 
for his driver’s licence and registration, the accused 
opened the centre console to retrieve the 
documents. The officer observed a billfold of cash 
wrapped by an elastic band in the console. On the 
outside was a $50 bill, but the officer did not know 
whether the denominations of the currency 
underneath were $50 bills. He thought there might 
be $100 bills.
The officer returned to his vehicle and conducted 
computer checks. He learned:
• the accused had a driver’s licence and was not a 
prohibited driver;
• the vehicle was registered;
• the accused had been convicted of marihuana 
cultivation in 2007; and
• the accused had been arrested but not charged 
in relat ion to a marihuana t raf f icking 
investigation in 2009. 
The officer decided to detain the  accused. He got 
out of his police car and returned to the accused’s 
vehicle. He then smelled cologne for the first time, 
which the officer believed was a masking agent to 
hide the smell of drugs. The accused was detained, 
given his rights to counsel and provided the 
standard police warning. After the accused was 
placed in the police car, the officer’s drug sniffing 
dog was deployed around the Acura and indicated 
an odour of a drug by sitting near the rear of the 
vehicle. The accused was then arrested for 
possessing a controlled substance and given his 
rights and warnings again. The officer then 
searched the vehicle and found 50 lbs of 
marihuana in the trunk. It was vacuum-sealed in 
half-pound bags. 
Sidebar: Officer’s Training & Experience
The officer was an experienced and trained drug 
investigator. He:
• Was a 15 year police member;
• Worked six years in general duty policing in an area with 
a lot of marihuana use and where he was involved in 75–
100 drug investigations.
• Spent five years with Integrated Border Enforcement, 
focusing on people transporting anything illegally across 
the border from the USA into Canada and where he was 
involved in 20–30 drug investigations. 
• Spent last three-and-a-half years in traffic services where 
he had assisted other units with their drug investigations 
and done his own drug investigations. He estimated that 
he had been involved in a total of 130–140 drug 
investigations where at least a third of them dealt with 
travelling criminals. 
• He described his experience with detecting travelling 
criminals as significantly more than probably most people 
in Canada. 
• At the date he stopped the accused, the officer had been 
an instructor at the RCMP Pipeline training course 
(designed to enhance an investigator’s ability to detect 
the presence of travelling criminals) for two years, having 
taken the course previous to that. 
• The officer’s dog was trained to detect the scent of drugs, 
including the scent of marihuana, and had been used in 
30–40 drug investigations.  
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Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer testified that the accused’s 
hand trembling was indicative  of 
someone more nervous than the average 
person who was pulled over. He also 
stated that drivers were not usually nervous to the 
point where they would break out in a sweat. As for 
the wad of bills, the officer believed, based on his 
training and experience, that it was most 
commonly related to criminal activity, and the 
transportation or carrying of contraband. The 
accused’s cultivation of marihuana in 2007 and his 
association to another investigation for marihuana 
trafficking were also significant to the officer. 
Based on these considerations, the officer said he 
decided to detain the accused for a drug 
investigation and use the drug sniffing dog. 
The accused challenged the lawfulness of the initial 
traffic  stop and his subsequent detention. He 
argued the stop was a random drug investigation. In 
his view, the officer did not have the necessary 
reasonable  suspicion to detain him nor the 
reasonable suspicion required to conduct a 
warrantless search by using the  drug detection dog. 
The judge concluded that the initial traffic stop was 
lawful as was the accused’s detention and the use 
of the drug dog. First, the  officer followed the 
accused’s car because he had clocked it speeding 
at 116  km/h and stopped it because it was 
connected to a prohibited driver.  The initial stop 
was conducted because the  car might be associated 
with a prohibited driver and for no other reason. 
The judge found the  traffic stop was not a random 
stop for drugs. Second, the accused’s continued 
detention was based on a reasonable suspicion. The 
accused appeared unusually nervous (trembling 
hands, fumbling with the window and facial sweat), 
there  was a wad of cash wrapped in an elastic band 
in the car console, and the officer was aware of the 
accused’s previous criminal record for marihuana 
cultivation and his subsequent arrest but no charge 
of trafficking in drugs. 
The judge was satisfied that the officer’s subjective 
belief the accused might be involved in a drug-
related offence was objectively substantiated. 
Finally, this reasonable  suspicion also justified the 
deployment of the dog. And once the dog indicated 
the presence of drugs, the officer had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused and the search of the 
vehicle was incidental to that valid arrest. There 
were no breaches of the accused’s ss.  8 or 
9 Charter  rights and the evidence was admissible. 
He was convicted of possessing marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
The accused challenged his 
conviction arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred by 
improperly determining that 
the reasonable suspicion standard was met. In his 
view, the  trial judge failed to consider the totality of 
the circumstances by mentioning only inculpatory 
factors and not considering exculpatory or neutral 
ones. As well, he submitted that the trial judge 
erred in concluding that the inculpatory factors met 
the legal standard of reasonable suspicion.  
Reasonable Suspicion
The accused contended that the trial judge did not 
consider the absence of several factors indicative of 
drug involvement in deciding whether the 
reasonable suspicion standard was met. Justice 
Ottenbreit, however, concluded the trial judge did 
not err in applying the reasonable suspicion 
standard. He did not fail to look at the totality of 
the factors. In his view, the trial judge was not 
required to take into consideration that absence of 
several other factors (see sidebar, p. 57). Justice 
Ottenbreit described the reasonable suspicion 
totality test as follows:
The reasonable suspicion standard derives its 
rigour from the requirement that it be based on 
objectively discernible facts, which can then be 
subjected to independent judicial scrutiny. 
However, consideration by a trial judge of the 
absence of certain inculpatory factors changes 
the focus from facts an officer actually 
observed, which obviously formed part of his 
thought process, to facts the officer did not 
observe. This is the wrong approach. 
[references omitted, para. 30]
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And further:
… the totality principle … does not require the 
trial judge to consider factors missing from the 
constellation of factors presented by the 
evidence. The absence of evidence of certain 
factors that could have been present to support 
reasonable suspicion is neither exculpatory nor 
neutral and does not attenuate the cogency of 
the factors that do exist, such as they are. That 
said, it may be that there is such a paucity of 
observable factors that a reasonable suspicion 
is not objectively raised. However, that is 
different than considering the absence of 
certain factors in the analysis.
In short, the totality of circumstances test 
requires the trial judge focus on what the 
observations of the officer actually were and 
the factors that were actually present to assess 
whether those factors looked at, in totality, 
support the possibility of criminal behaviour 
and rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. 
This means analyzing the totality of all 
obse rvab le , d i sce rn ib le , incu lpa to ry, 
exculpatory, neutral and equivocal factors. 
[references omitted, paras. 36-37]
The Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge 
correctly applied the totality of circumstances test. 
Was Reasonable Suspicion Satisfied?
In an effort to undermine the strength of the  factors 
the officer relied upon for his reasonable suspicion, 
the accused sought to challenge the reliability of 
the officer’s observations by inviting the Court of 
Appeal to minimize  or discount those factors. He 
sought to isolate individual factors and dissect the 
officer’s observations to reduce their impact and 
significance. 
But the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge 
did not err in determining that the constellation of 
inculpatory factors relied upon by the  officer to 
detain the accused and deploy a sniffing dog met 
the legal standard of reasonable suspicion. 
“Reasonable suspicion is a relatively low 
threshold,”  said Justice Ottenbreit. “The reasonable 
suspicion test … must be assessed against the 
existing evidence and looked at as a whole to 
determine if the threshold has been crossed.”
The accused’s level of nervousness, the wad of cash 
and  the accused’s record of a drug conviction and 
involvement in a further drug investigation, through 
the officer’s lens of training and experience, were 
objectively discernible factors that were verifiable.
“Although few in number, they are cogent and in 
total amount to more than a generalized 
suspicion,”  said Justice Ottenbreit. “Taking into 
account the totality of the circumstances and the 
threshold of the test … I am satisfied that on this 
constellation of factors there was a reasonable 
possibility that [the accused] was connected to a 
drug-related offence. Put another way, the 
constellation of factors was capable of supporting 
a logical inference of drug-related criminal 
behaviour by [the accused].” 
The trial judge did not err in finding reasonable 
suspicion and the accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Sidebar: Absent Factors
The factors the accused argued were not present but should 
have been considered by the trial judge:
• No scent of marihuana;
• There was no indicia of a quick turnaround trip;
• The vehicle was registered in Alberta, which according to 
the officer was not a “source” province;
• The presence of masking agents;
• The vehicle was properly registered in the accused’s 
name and was not a “third party vehicle”;
• There was no inconsistent or incredible story arising from 
the dialogue between the officer and the accused; 
• There was no evidence of multiple cell phones;
• There was no inexplicable pulling to the side of the road 
or adverse driving (such as a “nosedive”) nor was the 
vehicle travelling way below the speed limit;
• There was no evidence of suspicious posture/actions of 
the accused when he was driving;
• There was no evidence of any fast food, energy/power 
drinks or coffee; and
• The vehicle did not have a “slept in” or disheveled look. 
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BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
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knowledge for a career in public safety.
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2018 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2018-19.
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW WESTMINSTER
 
April 30 - May 14, 2018 
Introduction to Criminal Law (Monday's) 
(INVE-1001)
May 16-18, 2018 
Introduction to Investigative File Management 
(INVE-1010)
May 23-25, 2018
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
May 31, 2018
Personal Safety (INVE-1300)
June 2, 2018
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1000)
June 18, 2018
Forensic Digital Imaging (INVE-1013)
 June 25, 2018
Report Writing for Investigators (INVE-1005)
 
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
 May 9-11, 2018
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
June 11-15, 2018
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE-1004)
Personal Safety Training (INVE-1300) is not part of 
the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate 
Program, but offered by the Justice and Public Safety 
Division
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
